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FORUM ON THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Anthropology’s Science Wars
Insights from a New Survey
by Mark Horowitz, William Yaworsky, and Kenneth Kickham
In recent decades the field of anthropology has been characterized as sharply divided between proscience and anti-
science factions. The aim of this study is to empirically evaluate that characterization. We survey anthropologists in
graduate programs in the United States regarding their views of science and advocacy, moral and epistemic relativism,
and themerits of evolutionary biological explanations.We examine anthropologists’ views in concert with their varying
appraisals of major controversies in the discipline (Chagnon/Tierney, Mead/Freeman, andMenchú/Stoll).We find that
disciplinary specialization and especially gender and political orientation are significant predictors of anthropologists’
views.We interpret our findings through the lens of an intuitionist social psychology that helps explain the dynamics of
such controversies as well as ongoing ideological divisions in the field.
Controversy beckoned in 2010 when the leadership of the
American Anthropological Association (AAA) proposed re-
moving reference to “science” in its long-term plan. The “science
wars” of the nineties were a not-so-distant echo, after all, and yet
the scope of the response was unexpected. Writing in the New
York Times shortly thereafter, science journalist Nicholas Wade
(2010) suggested that the decision reopened a “long-simmering
tension” among anthropologists, whose science-oriented and
activist “factions” experienced a phase of “bitter tribal warfare.”
Alice Dreger (2010) echoed Wade’s construal and did not hesi-
tate to take sides. Decrying the AAA’s view of science as a “four-
letter word,”Dreger faulted those she dubbed “fluff-head” cultural
anthropologists prone to appear as “superheroes for oppressed
peoples.” The danger for the “real scientists” (including some
“non-fluff-head” cultural anthropologists) is a climate within
the discipline that “actively denigrates science” as just “another
wayof knowing”and “promotes activismoverdata collectionand
scientific theorizing” (Dreger 2010).
As the storm surged into the blogosphere, anthropologists
raised the alarm. Peter Wood (2010) warned in the Chronicle of
Higher Education about a “self-appointed radicalizing faction”
threatening the discipline. Shorn of its scientific basis, anthro-
pology would become, Wood feared, “little more than colorful
travel literature (travelogues) occasionally mixed up with po-
litical hucksterism and theoretical obscurantism.” Peter Pere-
grine, president of the Society for Anthropological Sciences,
emailed group members about the troubling development and
shared their resolution condemning the abandonment of the
field’s core principles.
While sensationalized as an “implosion of anthropology”
(Rosenberg 2010) or disciplinary “civil war” (Hartwell 2010),
the AAA executive board sought to defuse matters and reached
out to association leaders. In its formal response, the leadership
stressed that changes to the long-term plan were blown out of
proportion by media misrepresentations, which gave the mis-
taken impression of a field divided. Indeed, they underscored
their endorsement of the scientific method as “crucial to much
anthropological research,” noting that the changes were never
intended “to signal a break with the scientific foundations of
anthropology.” Executive board member Hugh Gusterson fol-
lowed suit in a joint radio interview with Peregrine (Lehrer
2010). He rejected the characterization of an antiscientific cur-
rent among anthropologists. “This is an unfortunate exhuma-
tion of a battle that ended a decade ago,” Gusterson remarked,
noting that there was a time in the nineties when postmodern
scholars embraced the “social construction of knowledge”—
but that “those days have ended” (Lehrer 2010). He added that
“many activist-oriented anthropologists” who are drawn to
advocacy today actually “embrace science.”
Peregrine was unmoved. “There is a real division within
the organization,” he stressed, one that has marginalized evo-
lutionary anthropologists in particular. Peregrine contrasted
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those anthropologists who seek to explain widespread cultural
variations—generally through a biocultural lens—with those
more inclined to description and understanding of cultural
particularity. “There is a subgroup of descriptive interpretive
anthropologists,” he asserted, “who do aggressively attack
scientific approaches.” Indeed, it is precisely this “very deep
rift” in the field that has made the battle over its mission “rage
the way that it has” (Lehrer 2010).
One scholar who has fallen into perhaps the deepest depths
of that rift is Napoleon Chagnon. If not the most maligned
anthropologist in memory (Eakin 2013), Chagnon’s research
among the Yanomami has certainly polarized the anthropology
community. We address the Chagnon controversy centrally in
our survey. Suffice to note here that he has not shrunk from
calling out what he sees as antiscientific attitudes among his
colleagues. In the final pages of his provocative memoir, Chag-
non (2013) chimes in regarding the AAA mission flap. He la-
ments that in the past 20 or so years, cultural anthropology has
come “precipitously close to abandoning the very notion of
science.” In his view, there is indeed a schism between an-
thropologistswho “do science” and thosewhose exclusive goal is
to “advocate on behalf of native peoples.” The latter are not just
wrong, Chagnon contends, but also “border on irresponsibility,”
as they define their advocacy as “incompatible with science.”
Moreover, Chagnon echoes Peregrine in linking anthropology’s
emphasis on postmodernism and advocacy to a deep current of
“biophobia”—a “chronic opposition in cultural anthropology to
ideas from biology” that may “help account for what humans in
all cultures did.”
Disciplinary harmony is hardly expected in academia and
perhaps less so in four-field anthropology. Yet here we have a
field allegedly fractured over the very foundations of scientific
practice, objectivity, and ethical responsibility. Are such char-
acterizations accurate? Is anthropology in fact divided into de-
monstrably proscience and antiscience factions? Do postmod-
ern sentiments endure in the discipline, undermining scientists’
commitment to objectivity and capacity for dispassionate ap-
proximations to truth? We examine these questions and more
with an eye to anthropologists’ political identities. We hope, in
this regard, to bolster a moral intuitionist interpretation of knowl-
edge production proposed in prior research.1 We will turn to
our survey in a moment, but first let us sketch the normative
tenor of the field’s major debates to provide context for our
chosen questions.
Construing the Postmodern Turn
Characterizing a movement or moment as postmodern is a
dicey undertaking. Whether we attend to the boundaries of
anthropology or beyond, the postmodern turn means many
different things to observers of many different shades of sym-
pathy, suspicion, or antipathy. Reflecting on his role in the
meteoric Writing Culture, Clifford (2015:25–31) suggests that
the text “imperfectly registered” anticolonial and feminist sen-
sibilities. Set against the backdrop of a late 1960s to early 1990s
“transitional moment,” Clifford describes a chastened insur-
gent outlook that replaced “frontal resistance to hegemony”
with “subversion,” “critique,” and the clearing of space for “dis-
crepant senses of the real” (25–31).
This decentering of hegemonic truth claims toward an
“epistemological diversity,” as Clifford puts it, is dissected by
Marcus and Fischer (1996) in their widely cited discussion
of the “crisis of representation” in the human sciences. No
longer confident in grand theoretical explanations—and ever
attentive to power relations and discursive contexts—inter-
pretive ethnographies would supplant generalizing explan-
atory frameworks in an avowedly contingent social world.
Stocking captures the mood perhaps best in his depiction of
an increasingly self-reflexive, fin de siècle anthropology:
Ideologically, it would move beyond the liberal posture of
relativistic tolerance towards one of radical engagement in
the struggles of the powerless against the holders of power.
Methodologically and epistemologically, it would reject the
positivistic assumption that cultures or cultural behavior could
be observed as “objects” in the external world, and recognize
the essential reflexivity of participant observation, and the
inherently problematic character of the knowledge generated
by the ethnographic process. (Stocking 1995:65–66)
Stocking refers to anthropology’s “relativizing critique” of
science over three decades, as well its “debiologizing” and
historicizing tendencies throughout the century. The many
permutations in the debate over the politics of representation
exceed our scope here. Yet we see in our brief sketch that the
twin concerns of political responsibility in a stratified world
and suspicion of authoritative representations of that world
(especially by Western observers) have long preoccupied an-
thropologists. Indeed, the spirit of such concerns appears to
animate some of the most vivid controversies in the field.
Moral Readings and Epistemological Angst
Machetes, Menchú, and Mead
Anthropological controversies over the years often occasion
what Segerstrale (2000) calls “moral reading.” When a text or
theory is read morally, it is considered in terms of the typi-
cally baneful political consequences it allegedly causes. Such
1. We build here on former investigations of controversies in sociology,
economics, and evolutionary anthropology (Horowitz and Hughes 2017;
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham 2014; Yaworsky, Horowitz, and Kick-
ham 2015). Our aim is to contribute to a social psychology of knowledge in
the social sciences. We take a social-psychological rather than a traditional
“sociology of knowledge” approach in that the latter tends to highlight wider
historical and cultural forces that shape knowledge production from with-
out. We suggest a complementary social-psychological approach that at-
tends “bottom up” from scholars’moral intuitions (and consequent political
identities) to their often “tribal” constructions of knowledge. We unpack
these ideas in further detail in our discussion below.
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham Anthropology’s Science Wars 675
This content downloaded from 129.113.053.071 on November 11, 2019 09:25:50 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
normative critique may call out an author’s hidden ideolog-
ical agenda or hold them accountable for how their findings
are used in the wider political arena.
Chagnon’s work is prototypical in this regard. Shortly after
publishing his 1988 Science article linking male violence to
marital and reproductive success among the Yanomami, the
Brazilian Anthropological Association sent a letter to the AAA
ethics committee alerting North American anthropologists to
the danger (Carneiro da Cunha 1989). The letter condemned
Chagnon’s misrepresentations of Yanomami violence, which
were appropriated in the press by political and mining interests
bent on exploiting the region’s land and resources. Similarly,
Chagnon’s behavior in the field has been subject to withering
critique. Most famously, Marshall Sahlins condemned Chag-
non’s ethical breaches in obtaining genealogies from a people
deeply reticent about revealing the names of the dead. Sahlins
(2000) denounced Chagnon’s use of “draconian devices” to so-
licit names, from “bribery” and trading of machetes and other
goods to “exploiting animosities” in the villages (much of which
Chagnon acknowledges in his writings). For Sahlins and other
critics, Chagnon helped instigate the very violence he would
later use in stereotyping the Yanomami as “fierce.” All of this
was done, Sahlins lamented, “for the sake of science”—despite
the irrevocable “pain and hate” visited upon the Yanomami.2
Criticism of Chagnon’s research has not been limited to its
purported moral offenses or political misuses. Scientific and
empirical challenges abound. Above all, critics contest his so-
ciobiological account of the roots and extent of Yanomami vi-
olence. Ferguson (1995a, 2015) highlights broader historical
factors in shaping patterns of violence—particularly Western
colonial influence through proximity to trade in highly sought
steel tools. He and others dispute Chagnon’s statistics as well,
especially his data on unokai “killers”—dismissed by Sahlins
(2000) as having perhaps the “shortest half-life” of any study in
Science—as well as the nature and rate of female abductions
(e.g., Albert 1989; Lizot and Dart 1994). In the end, Chagnon’s
critics paint what they see as a more balanced picture of Ya-
nomami aggression, attentive to historically specific causes in
no way attributable to an allegedly primordial Hobbesian past.
Our report does not aim to adjudicate conflicting claims in
this or other controversies. We submit, however, that disen-
tangling the empirical and the normative in these debates is
tricky, not least because they implicate authors’moral intuitions
and “emotive communities” (more on this below). We hope
nonetheless that our sketch of the social psychological aspects of
such controversies contributes to greater self-consciousness in
the field, perhaps aiding deeper consensus on vital empirical
matters down the road.
Although hardly as tenacious as the Chagnon saga, David
Stoll’s (1999) exposé of the testimonio of famed Guatemalan
activist Rigoberta Menchú certainly piqued passions. Stoll dis-
covered several claims in her narrative that did not square with
the facts (e.g., that Menchú was illiterate and received no
formal education, that wealthy ladinos sought belligerently for
decades to steal her family’s land, and that she witnessed the
immolation of her brother by the Guatemalan army). Stoll
contested many such claims, citing archival records and scores
of interviews with neighbors and extended family. Perhaps
most contentious was his broader challenge to Menchú’s
portrayal of widespread peasant provocation and support of
the guerrilla movement.
Stoll’s book and consequent New York Times reporting
(Rohter 1998) were embraced by far-right observers as vindi-
cation of Menchú’s mendacity (D’Souza 1998; Horowitz 1999).
Progressive and academic responses were far from friendly to
Stoll, however, as moral readings snowballed (Arias 2001). Pratt
(2001) rebuked Stoll’s “hubris,” asking how, in light of the Gua-
temalan army’s “monstrosities” and the US government “com-
plicity,” one could have “an ethical compass whose point of ori-
entation is not these truths but the truth that Menchú was not
present when they killed her brother or that she does not dis-
cuss her family’s internal quarrels” (Pratt 2001:43–46). Som-
mer (2001) added that Stoll was “probably right to quibble over
Rigoberta’s facts,” yet asked why he “wants to shift attention
away from the genocidal war waged by the Guatemalan gov-
ernment against its indigenous population” (239).
While some challenged the validity of Stoll’s findings—ac-
cusing him of cherry-picking his sources or questioning their
veracity—a more common response was to raise larger episte-
mological questions about the nature and intent of testimonio.
Attentive to the “geopolitics of truth” (Pratt 2001), the genre
became framed as a collective political enterprise, representing
plural and marginalized voices rather than a single “objective”
truth privileged by Western academics (Fermin 2001; Smith
2001). The arguments in this vein tend to be subtle, if not opaque,
prompting critics to dismiss them as “postmodern obfuscations”
(Patai 2001:273). Hence Pratt (2001) writes that “marginalized
groups are insisting on entering into dialogue with lettered
knowledge, from alternative epistemological grounds;” testimo-
nio has “undermined the hierarchy” of “lettered knowledge over
narrated experience;” and “despite the metropolitan cult of the
fact, it is common in everyday practice that verisimilitude counts
as veracity” (41–43). Smith (2001) concurs by stressing “new
ways” of seeing “truth and responsibility” that welcome diverse
“positions and positionalities” (151–152). Yet “Stoll’s very posi-
tionality,” she cautions, represents “the illusory truth of ‘objec-
tive’ reportage” (Pratt 2001:151–152).
2. Sahlins would later resign from the National Academy of Sciences,
partly in protest over Chagnon’s election. Chagnon’s critics cheered the
move. Perhaps the most caustic (and colorful) criticism was penned by
David Graeber, who suggested that Chagnon “vilified a group of human
beings so that enormous violence could be unleashed on them.” Graeber
continued by affirming that Sahlins is a “man of genuine principle,” who
“never had a lot of patience for shirtless macho Americans who descend
into jungles declaring their inhabitants to be violent savages, and then
use that as an excuse to start behaving like violent savages themselves—
except with command over infinitely greater technological resources”
(cited in Golden 2013).
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While calls for multivocality shorn of the pursuit of objec-
tivity strike us as paradoxical—and we are wary of alternative
epistemological grounds that are left unspecified—we will hold
our reflections on questions of power and epistemology for our
concluding discussion. Here we step back from the polemics to
take stock of the field. Does distrust toward scientific objectivity
characterize contemporary anthropology? Is such epistemic
relativism more preponderant in cultural anthropology than in
the other subfields? Are there demographic factors that may
influence variation in anthropologists’ views?
The third and no doubt most famous controversy addressed
in this survey is Derek Freeman’s (1983, 1999) challenge to
Margaret Mead’s classic research on adolescence in Samoa.
Without belaboring the details of this familiar drama, suffice to
note that the claims and counterclaims about Samoan life were
politicized right out of the gate. As Shankman (2009:210) notes
in his absorbing overview, Freeman’s book found a receptive
audience among conservatives in the context of the culture wars
of the eighties. His purported debunking of Mead’s allegedly
ideological embrace of cultural relativism was welcome news to
those who viewed moral laxity as the prime culprit of societal
ills. Moreover, the fledgling field of sociobiology found the
characterization of Mead as an antievolutionary cultural de-
terminist an inviting foil, as they sought to deepen the scientific
heft of their budding program. Popular evolutionary psychol-
ogists such as Steven Pinker, David Buss, andMatt Ridley would
echo aspects of Freeman’s critique, including his claim thatMead
was duped by a couple of her Samoan informants (Shankman
2009:207–210). As Shankman shows through careful research,
however, Freeman’s portrayal of Mead entailed substantial
cherry-picking from her writings, consistently omitting her ref-
erences to biological determinants of behavior, an ironic finding
given Freeman’s critique of Mead’s ideologically driven agenda.3
However one-sided Freeman’s representation of Mead, it is
evident that theMead/Boas legacy is typically evoked in terms of
its moral relativist critique of old Eurocentric claims of biolog-
ical and cultural superiority. Indeed, Mead’s career embodies a
tension still visible in anthropology today—a passionate com-
mitment to advocacy and human rights coupled with hesitancy,
given the legacy of colonialism, to privilege Western society’s
norms or values over those of others. For critics of moral rela-
tivism today, however, what was once a corrective to colonial
racism has become a logically self-refuting and politically irre-
sponsible position (see, e.g., Bagish 1981; Harris 2010).4
To be sure, questions of relativism, advocacy, and ethical
responsibility endure in the field (e.g., Abu-Lughod 2002;
D’Andrade 1995; Scheper-Hughes 1995; Shweder 2000). We
will hardly resolve such matters in this study. We are sur-
prised, however, that our survey appears to be the first to at-
tempt to gauge the field as a whole on these issues.We question
anthropologists candidly and in straightforward language,
querying them as well on controversial recent research re-
visiting the explosive category of race (Cochran, Hardy, and
Harpending 2006).
Methods
Survey Sample and Questions
We compiled a list of 1,632 anthropologists in all doctoral
anthropology programs in the United States using AAA’s
AnthroGuide 2013–2014. We included additional faculty on
departmental websites and eliminated all invalid, repeating,
or unverifiable emails, for a revised list of 1,553 professors.
After an email and follow-up in October 2016, we received
301 usable surveys, for a 19% response rate.5 We hope that
our focus on faculty in doctoral programs affords a glimpse
into the likely direction of the field, given their role in train-
ing future anthropologists. Table 1 reports relevant charac-
teristics of our sample, including demographics and respon-
dents’ self-identified political orientations.
Substantively, our survey addresses questions grouped into
the following four thematic categories: (1) science and episte-
mology, (2) moral relativism and advocacy, (3) biology and
culture, and (4) controversial legacies. Table 2 lists the questions.
As can be seen, we crafted the questionnaire while being at-
tentive to the aforementioned splits over epistemology, activ-
ism, and the merits of evolutionary biology. Respondents were
asked Likert-type items, that is, whether they “strongly agree,”
“agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” or “strongly
disagree” with the 38 statements.6 We are cognizant that for-
mulating workable survey questions often invites objections,
especially with regard to controversy, so we aimed in our fram-
ing to use as familiar and unambiguous language as possible.We
begin here with an overview of the findings of the field as a
whole, then turn to interpretation of salient and indeed sur-
prising patterns in the data.
Findings
A Bird’s-Eye View of the Field
Table 3 provides a description of anthropologists’ overall re-
sponses. The findings at this level of generality are simple yet
offer a useful springboard to explore obvious points of con-
sensus or division.
3. In his new afterword to the 2016 edition of The Blank Slate, Pinker
acknowledges (following his reading of Shankman) that his uncritical
repetition of Freeman’s claims needs to be “modified.”
4. Harris (2010:221) refers to what he sees as widespread moral rel-
ativism among liberal intellectuals as a kind of “learned pathology.”
Hardly mincing words, he condemns the AAA’s well-known statement
to the United Nations in 1947—widely seen as an endorsement of rel-
ativism—as “the best the social sciences could do in the United States
with the crematoria of Auschwitz still smoking” (221).
5. Note that we had 342 original entrants, with 41 electing not to an-
swer a single substantive question (beyond demographics).
6. These include six speculative “Biology and culture” questions (BC5–
BC10) that ask respondents to gauge the “plausibility” or “implausibility”
of the respective items.
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We see in items SE1 and SE2 that anthropologists in our
sample overwhelmingly affirm the value of science to society,
with strong majorities agreeing that science improves human
well-being (89%), and that the voices of scientists should be
heeded in government policy (86%). Moreover, only a small
fraction (13%) affirms that the AAA’s 2010 proposal to remove
“science” from its long-term plan was a worthy aim. Such
views should give pause to facile characterizations of the field
as antiscience.
With regard to epistemology, however, the picture muddies.
Here we see sizable minorities of anthropologists agree that
traditional indigenous cosmologies are “no less ‘true’ than mod-
ern scientific explanations” (31%) and that science is “just
one way of knowing, no more valid or accurate than other
approaches to knowledge” (22%). Although a solid majority of
respondents (67%) concur that the best scientific theories pro-
vide “truthful representations of reality,” fewer than half (47%)
reject the view that anthropologists’ depictions of indigenous
cultures “reflect more their own power and interests” than
“ ‘true’ descriptions of those cultures.” Although we cannot at-
tend to every question here, the ambivalence of the field re-
garding epistemology is unmistakable. In fact, modest major-
ities affirm both that postmodern theories make an “important
contribution to the field” (60%) and that “antiscientific atti-
tudes” are undermining the discipline (54%).
Questions of moral relativism reveal greater consensus.
Eighty-nine percent of respondents support the UN Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and 72% personally view female genital
mutilation as “brutal and unethical” wherever it is practiced.
Only about one-sixth of the field (18%) believes that the
procedure should not be condemned by Western anthropol-
ogists. These findings render hyperbolic claims by critics such
as Harris (2010) that the field is muddled in an allegedly ob-
tuse moral relativism.
Considerations of advocacy divide the field, however. Fifty-
four percent of anthropologists affirm their ethical respon-
sibility to “stand in solidarity with the marginalized groups
they study.” Fifty-two percent reject the view that the AAA
should avoid “politically oriented” resolutions or boycotts. And
last, anthropologists are about evenly divided over whether
advocacy and fieldwork should be kept separate to protect the
“objectivity” of research (SE10).
The biology and culture questions appear most divisive.
With the exception of queries on race—where large majori-
ties deny the utility of the concept and the reality of “racial”
differences (BC3, BC4, BC10)—the field’s appraisal of evolution-
ary biology is contentious. Just under one-third of respondents
(32%) view as “misguided” evolutionary attempts to uncover
“universal” features of human cultures. Yet 57% of respondents
attest to the “important contribution” that evolutionary per-
spectives make in explaining “key aspects” of such cultures. We
see comparable divisions when we turn to more speculative
questions regarding humans’ evolutionary heritage. Anthro-
pologists are closely split over the plausibility of whether hu-
man prehistory was more peaceful than industrial society,
whether tribal conflict was a principal selective force in human
nature, and whether men have evolved a desire for more sexual
variety than women (BC5, BC6, BC8).
The legacies of Mead and Chagnon suggest a mixed bag.7
Two-thirds of respondents agree that Mead “romanticizes the
sexual freedom of Samoan adolescents,” while just under
one-half affirm that she was “ideologically motivated” to do so.
Amodest 28% endorse Derek Freeman’s charge thatMead was
duped by a number of her Samoan informants, while only
36% find Freeman’s 1983 critique “unconvincing.” Regarding
Chagnon, and given his notoriety, it is hardly surprising
that anthropologists’ responses would prove sharply polar-
ized. Indeed, the field is closely divided over whether Chagnon
“harmed the Yanomami by acting unethically in his field-
work” and whether his provocative research on unokai repro-
ductive success is “credible” (CL5, CL7). While close to half
of the field (48%) finds his work “ideologically motivated,” al-
most asmany respondents (45%) viewPatrick Tierney’s ruinous
allegations inDarkness in El Dorado as “thoroughly discredited.”
We see, hence, a field divided. To probe more deeply the
variegated results, we turn to three areas where significant
Table 1. Sample characteristics of anthropologists
Characteristics Respondents (n p 301) Percent
Gender:
Female 126 42
Male 172 58
Age:
30–45 81 27
46–61 120 40
621 97 33
Subdiscipline:
Archaeology 93 32
Biological 70 24
Cultural 118 41
Linguistic 9 3
Academic rank:
Assistant professor 46 16
Associate professor 91 33
Professor 142 51
Political orientation:
Radical 37 13
Liberal 213 73
Moderate 36 12
Conservative 2 1
Libertarian 3 1
Note. The table leaves out a modest number of missing cases across
categories.
7. We will not address the David Stoll/Rigoberta Menchú controversy
here due to the paucity of meaningful survey responses. (Although we
return to it in our discussion below.) Despite the fervor of the contro-
versy in the late nineties, relatively few anthropologists appear conver-
sant with it today and fewer yet take decided positions. To wit: 55% of
anthropologists reveal “no knowledge” of the controversy, and among
the others, fewer than one in five (on average) mark agreement or dis-
agreement with any of the corresponding survey items.
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Table 2. Survey items
Survey item Survey item description
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1 On balance, advances in scientific knowledge over the years have improved human well-being.
SE2 Society would be better off if the consensus views of scientists were better heeded in government and public policy.
SE3 On the whole, traditional indigenous knowledges regarding medicine or cosmology are no less “true” than modern
scientific explanations.
SE4 Science is just one way of knowing, no more valid or accurate than other approaches to knowledge.
SE5 At their best, scientific theories provide truthful representations of reality beyond merely instrumentally
useful predictions.
SE6 Anthropologists’ depictions of indigenous cultures reflect more their own power and interests as knowledge
producers than “true” descriptions of the reality of those cultures.
SE7 Anthropology is undermined today by antiscientific attitudes in the discipline.
SE8 The American Anthropological Association’s (AAA) 2010 proposal to remove references to “science” in its
long-term plan—affirming that the purpose of the association is to advance “public understanding of
humankind”—was a worthy effort.
SE9 Postmodern theories have made an important contribution to anthropology.
SE10 Advocacy and fieldwork should be kept as separate as possible to help protect the objectivity of the research.
Moral relativism and
advocacy (MR):
MR1 I support the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR2 No matter how “brutal” some cultural practices may appear (e.g., female genital mutilation, sati, etc.), we should
not condemn such practices as anthropologists from Western societies.
MR3 I personally find female genital mutilation (type III—infibulation) to be a brutal and unethical procedure regardless
of how it is viewed in the places where it is practiced.
MR4 I consider myself to be a moral relativist.
MR5 Anthropologists have an ethical responsibility within their research to stand in solidarity with the marginalized
groups they study.
MR6 As an academic organization, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) should not be involved
in proposing any politically oriented resolutions, academic boycotts, et cetera.
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1 Attempts to use evolutionary biology to explain “universal” features of human cultures are misguided.
BC2 Evolutionary biological perspectives make a significant contribution to explaining key aspects of human cultures.
BC3 The social construct of “race” has no corresponding biological reality.
BC4 Attempts to discover a genetic component to behavioral differences between “racial” groups are bound to fail.
BC5 Whatever the variability, foraging societies in prehistory were on the whole more peaceful than later agricultural
or industrial societies (i.e. they experienced less violence and homicide on average).
BC6 Tribal conflict was a principal selective force that shaped human nature.
BC7 People’s taste for foods containing fat and sugar is prewired into our brains by evolution. Such high-energy
foods conferred a fitness advantage in humans’ ancestral environment—hence people evolved an impulse
to gorge on such foods.
BC8 Men have a biologically evolved desire for more sexual variety than women.
BC9 Multiple sexual partners among women and men was common in foraging societies in prehistory, where paternity
was not a major concern.
BC10 The comparatively high IQ scores and disproportionate scientific contributions of Ashkenazi Jews (e.g., Nobel and
Fields Medal Prizes, etc.) reflect in part a genetic component of their intelligence.
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1 In Coming of Age in Samoa, Margaret Mead romanticizes the sexual freedom of Samoan adolescents.
CL2 Mead’s description of Samoan sexual norms was significantly influenced by her being duped by some
of her Samoan informants.
CL3 Derek Freeman’s criticism of Mead in Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropo-
logical Myth is unconvincing.
CL4 Mead was ideologically motivated to present a permissive portrait of sexual norms in Samoa.
CL5 Napoleon Chagnon harmed the Yanomami by acting unethically in his fieldwork.
CL6 Chagnon was ideologically motivated to present a bellicose view of human nature in his research.
CL7 Chagnon’s research documenting a link between male violence and reproductive success among the
Yanomami is credible.
CL8 The major claims in Patrick Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado have been thoroughly discredited.
CL9 David Stoll’s Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans accurately documents a number of
misrepresentations by Menchú about her life, such as her educational background and the nature
of her family’s land dispute.
CL10 Stoll’s search for factual misrepresentations in Menchú’s story was reprehensible given Menchú’s background
in the Guatemalan civil war (including the army’s murder of members of her family).
CL11 Stoll’s research was carried out poorly.
CL12 Stoll was politically motivated to discredit Menchú and Guatemala’s guerilla movement.
This content downloaded from 129.113.053.071 on November 11, 2019 09:25:50 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
patterns emerged in the data: anthropologists’ subfield spe-
cialty, gender, and political identity.
Disciplinary Divisions
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report responses by anthropological specialty,
gender, and political orientation. These descriptive tables are
helpful in providing baselines with regard to where the various
groupings stand on the survey items. Reading them in tandem
with our regression models in table 7 nicely captures both the
meaning and the statistical significance of the salient patterns.
Regarding subfield, the first anthropological camp appears
to be biological anthropologists, who vary significantly from
their colleagues on 16 survey items across all four thematic
categories (see table 7).8 Biological anthropologists are much
less likely to reveal any hint of epistemological relativism
than their colleagues. They are significantly less likely to view
science as just “another way of knowing” (SE4) or to value the
contributions of postmodern theories (SE9). They contrast
sharply with their sociocultural colleagues by affirming that
research “objectivity” should be protected by strict separation
of advocacy and fieldwork (SE10), and they are significantly
Table 3. Distribution of survey responses
Survey item Question description n Percent agreea Percent disagreea
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1 Scientific advances have improved well-being 289 89 2
SE2 Society better off if scientists heeded on policy 288 86 3
SE3 Traditional indigenous knowledges no less “true” 286 31 41
SE4 Science is just one way of knowing 289 22 61
SE5 Best theories represent reality truthfully 282 67 9
SE6 Depictions reflect power more than “truth” 281 17 47
SE7 Field is undermined by antiscientific attitudes 288 54 28
SE8 AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy effort 288 13 65
SE9 Postmodern theories made important contribution 288 60 23
SE10 Advocacy and fieldwork kept separate for objectivity 292 39 43
Moral relativism and advocacy (MR):
MR1 Support UN Declaration of Human Rights 300 89 1
MR2 “Brutal” cultural practices should not be condemned 300 18 58
MR3 Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical 300 72 9
MR4 I consider myself to be a moral relativist 301 29 38
MR5 Should stand in solidarity with marginalized groups 291 54 17
MR6 AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc. 293 33 52
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1 Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided 283 32 45
BC2 Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute 281 57 23
BC3 Social construct of “race” has no biological reality 281 76 15
BC4 No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences 280 78 8
BC5b Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful 280 37 34
BC6b Tribal conflict was a principal selective force 278 36 33
BC7b Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution 276 65 17
BC8b Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety 274 31 38
BC9b Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common 268 41 20
BC10b Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component 273 14 57
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1 Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans 260 66 9
CL2 Mead duped by Samoan informants 261 28 25
CL3 Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing 261 36 19
CL4 Mead ideologically motivated 264 49 10
CL5 Chagnon harmed the Yanomami 263 41 34
CL6 Chagnon ideologically motivated 263 48 24
CL7 Chagnon’s research credible 262 38 31
CL8 Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited 251 45 13
CL9 Stoll accurately documents Menchú 218 26 4
CL10 Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible 217 12 18
CL11 Stoll’s research was carried out poorly 211 8 5
CL12 Stoll politically motivated 215 18 5
Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
a Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
8. Note that we use linguistic anthropologists as the reference group
in the subfield models. This makes sense, as they make up the smallest
branch of the discipline, reflected proportionally in our sample.
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more likely to believe that the AAA should not propose any
politically oriented resolutions or boycotts (MR6).
Unsurprisingly, biological anthropologists are significantly
more likely to endorse evolutionary approaches to human cul-
tures. Yet they differ significantly on the more speculative ques-
tions as well. They are much more receptive to evolutionary ex-
planations of people’s “prewired” taste for fats and sweets (BC7),
while expressing greater skepticism of the view that paternity was
no major concern in polyamorous prehistoric societies (BC9).
Note that although there is strong consensus in the field denying
the utility of the construct of “race,” biological anthropologists
are less likely to deny any corresponding biological reality to the
construct (BC4). Moreover, although the difference does not
reach statistical significance when controlling for other factors, a
Table 4. Distribution of survey responses by anthropological specialty
Survey item Question description
Archaeology
(% agree/disagree)a
Biological
(% agree/disagree)a
Cultural
(% agree/disagree)a
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1 Scientific advances have improved well-being 93/2 93/0 85/3
SE2 Society better off if scientists heeded on policy 87/3 90/4 85/3
SE3 Traditional indigenous knowledges no less “true” 32/37 20/63 37/31
SE4 Science is just one way of knowing 22/63 8/85 29/46
SE5 Best theories represent reality truthfully 68/9 78/9 60/8
SE6 Depictions reflect power more than “truth” 20/43 19/36 14/56
SE7 Field is undermined by antiscientific attitudes 60/23 85/4 31/47
SE8 AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy
effort
7/76 3/89 20/49
SE9 Postmodern theories made important contribution 63/23 39/41 69/12
SE10 Advocacy and fieldwork kept separate for objectivity 51/38 54/29 21/55
Moral relativism and
advocacy (MR):
MR1 Support UN Declaration of Human Rights 94/1 84/1 88/1
MR2 “Brutal” cultural practices should not be
condemned
15/57 24/63 16/56
MR3 Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical 84/2 80/4 56/16
MR4 I consider myself to be a moral relativist. 33/33 32/35 21/44
MR5 Should stand in solidarity with marginalized
groups
51/19 49/18 60/13
MR6 AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc. 34/49 45/41 25/58
Biology and culture (BC): Biology and culture
BC1 Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided 30/46 16/67 44/31
BC2 Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute 61/17 77/8 41/38
BC3 Social construct of “race” has no biological reality 79/14 61/28 81/9
BC4 No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences 69/9 73/14 87/1
BC5b Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful 31/39 30/44 48/23
BC6b Tribal conflict was a principal selective force 38/33 44/30 30/39
BC7b Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution 62/16 83/7 58/22
BC8b Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety 26/38 45/28 24/45
BC9b Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common 36/11 35/37 48/18
BC10b Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component 14/57 21/51 9/64
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1 Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans 63/6 63/5 71/12
CL2 Mead duped by Samoan informants 33/15 30/16 24/37
CL3 Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing 28/21 24/19 49/18
CL4 Mead ideologically motivated in Samoa 46/14 37/8 59/8
CL5 Chagnon harmed the Yanomami 39/30 17/60 58/23
CL6 Chagnon ideologically motivated 51/21 20/38 66/19
CL7 Chagnon’s research credible 38/23 64/11 26/47
CL8 Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited 44/6 69/2 34/24
CL9 Stoll accurately documents Menchú 21/7 16/0 33/3
CL10 Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible 8/15 4/18 19/20
CL11 Stoll’s research was carried out poorly 10/3 6/4 7/7
CL12 Stoll politically motivated 11/3 10/2 24/9
Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
a Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
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larger minority of biological anthropologists (21% vs. 14% for
the full sample) finds plausible the incendiary hypothesis by
Cochran et al. (2006) of a genetic component toAshkenazi Jewish
intelligence (BC10).
Biological anthropologists’ appraisals of Napoleon Chagnon
represent a dramatic rift in the field. In fact, they differ signifi-
cantly from their colleagues on each item. Only 17% (versus
58% of cultural anthropologists) believe that Chagnon harmed
the Yanomami by acting unethically in his fieldwork, and only
20% see his research as ideologically motivated. In contrast to
their archaeological and cultural colleagues, solidmajorities find
Chagnon’s sociobiological research credible (64%) and dismiss
the major claims in Tierney’s book (69%).
We suspect that the findings here would hardly surprise an-
thropologists. Might we attribute them simply to differences in
subdisciplinary training and practice? At home with the norms
of the natural sciences (and steeped in evolutionary theory), one
would expect biological anthropologists to be less congenial to
epistemological intricacies and more prone to support their so-
ciobiological brethren. We do indeed contend in our discussion
that subfield socialization plays a role in cultivating anthro-
pologists’ orientations to these controversial issues. Yet the
Table 5. Distribution of survey responses by gender
Survey item Question description
Women
(% agree/disagree)a
Men
(% agree/disagree)a
Science and epistemology (SE): Science and epistemology
SE1 Scientific advances have improved well-being 82/1 92/2
SE2 Society better off if scientists heeded on policy 83/1 89/2
SE3 Traditional indigenous knowledges no less “true” 49/23 19/55
SE4 Science is just one way of knowing 36/42 12/73
SE5 Best theories represent reality truthfully 60/9 71/9
SE6 Depictions reflect power more than “truth” 28/35 11/55
SE7 Field is undermined by antiscientific attitudes 45/33 61/23
SE8 AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy effort 18/62 9/68
SE9 Postmodern theories made important contribution 67/18 55/27
SE10 Advocacy and fieldwork kept separate for objectivity 26/56 49/34
Moral relativism and advocacy (MR):
MR1 Support UN Declaration of Human Rights 88/1 89/2
MR2 “Brutal” cultural practices should not be condemned 20/56 17/60
MR3 Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical 69/12 74/7
MR4 I consider myself to be a moral relativist 30/38 27/38
MR5 Should stand in solidarity with marginalized groups 61/12 50/20
MR6 AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc. 22/62 42/43
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1 Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided 42/32 25/52
BC2 Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute 45/29 65/18
BC3 Social construct of “race” has no biological reality 73/18 78/13
BC4 No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences 80/8 75/8
BC5b Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful 43/31 32/35
BC6b Tribal conflict was a principal selective force 24/41 44/28
BC7b Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution 56/26 72/10
BC8b Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety 23/51 37/29
BC9b Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common 45/20 38/20
BC10b Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component 10/62 17/53
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1 Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans 59/8 71/8
CL2 Mead duped by Samoan informants 20/30 34/22
CL3 Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing 36/17 36/21
CL4 Mead ideologically motivated 41/14 54/8
CL5 Chagnon harmed the Yanomami 51/21 34/43
CL6 Chagnon ideologically motivated 59/14 39/31
CL7 Chagnon’s research credible 25/36 47/28
CL8 Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited 41/13 49/13
CL9 Stoll accurately documents Menchú 29/3 24/4
CL10 Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible 16/17 9/17
CL11 Stoll’s research was carried out poorly 11/2 6/7
CL12 Stoll politically motivated 20/5 16/6
Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
a Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
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suspicion thatmore is at play is confirmed by attention to gender
and political identity. Our findings regarding both gender and
politics surpass expectations and bolster our call for a social-
psychology of knowledge production in the sciences.
Turning first to gender, we see that females diverge signifi-
cantly frommales on 21 of the 38 items (see table 6). They differ
on every item specific to epistemology, evincing much greater
receptiveness to relativism (e.g., about half affirm that indige-
nous “knowledges” regarding medicine and cosmology are no
less “true” than modern scientific explanations), and they show
much less inclination to separate advocacy and fieldwork for
the sake of objectivity (26% vs. 49% of males). Although anal-
ogous to men on questions of advocacy and moral relativism
(with the exception of the AAA’s political activities), women
diverge notably in their appraisals of evolutionary biology and
Chagnon’s legacy.Women are significantly less inclined to value
Table 6. Distribution of survey responses by political orientation
Survey item Question description
Radicals
(% agree/disagree)a
Liberals
(% agree/disagree)a
Moderates
(% agree/disagree)a
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1 Scientific advances have improved well-being 83/3 89/1 97/0
SE2 Society better off if scientists heeded on policy 86/0 89/2 79/9
SE3 Traditional indigenous knowledges no less true 42/17 30/45 29/44
SE4 Science is just one way of knowing 29/37 22/64 18/64
SE5 Best theories represent reality truthfully 53/12 68/10 84/0
SE6 Depictions reflect power more than “truth” 26/29 18/50 9/39
SE7 Field is undermined by antiscientific attitudes 22/56 59/25 65/12
SE8 AAA removing reference to “science” a worthy effort 31/34 10/70 6/76
SE9 Postmodern theories made important contribution 70/6 60/25 55/24
SE10 Advocacy and fieldwork kept separate for objectivity 6/69 41/43 59/24
Moral relativism and
advocacy (MR):
MR1 Support UN Declaration of Human Rights 92/0 91/0 83/6
MR2 “Brutal” cultural practices should not be
condemned
14/42 17/61 17/27
MR3 Female genital mutilation is brutal and unethical 62/14 74/9 65/3
MR4 I consider myself to be a moral relativist 30/38 31/37 17/33
MR5 Should stand in solidarity with marginalized groups 78/6 54/16 32/32
MR6 AAA should not propose resolutions, boycotts, etc. 6/83 36/50 41/29
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1 Evolutionary “universal” explanations misguided 51/23 31/54 24/41
BC2 Evolutionary biological perspectives contribute 31/43 62/21 55/12
BC3 Social construct of “race” has no biological reality 85/9 75/16 70/15
BC4 No genetics to “racial” behavioral differences 91/0 78/10 63/9
BC5b Foraging societies in prehistory more peaceful 56/15 36/35 29/50
BC6b Tribal conflict was a principal selective force 18/52 38/33 44/28
BC7b Taste for fat and sugar prewired by evolution 47/35 72/14 52/15
BC8b Men have evolved desire for more sexual variety 9/59 33/36 36/36
BC9b Multiple sexual partners in prehistory common 55/6 43/21 29/23
BC10b Intelligence of Ashkenazi Jews genetic component 6/68 14/61 19/39
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1 Mead romanticizes sexual freedom of Samoans 59/8 65/10 72/6
CL2 Mead duped by Samoan informants 12/35 29/25 38/22
CL3 Freeman’s criticism of Mead unconvincing 47/12 36/17 34/31
CL4 Mead ideologically motivated in Samoa 44/12 49/11 50/3
CL5 Napolean Chagnon harmed the Yanomami 74/9 38/38 31/41
CL6 Chagnon ideologically motivated 82/0 45/27 28/31
CL7 Chagnon’s research credible 15/64 39/28 55/15
CL8 Tierney’s Darkness in El Dorado discredited 19/22 48/12 67/0
CL9 Stoll accurately documents Menchú 24/6 26/4 23/0
CL10 Stoll’s search for misrepresentations reprehensible 30/12 10/18 0/26
CL11 Stoll’s research was carried out poorly 10/3 10/5 0/5
CL12 Stoll politically motivated 34/0 15/7 10/5
Note. AAA p American Anthropological Association.
a Percentages rounded and collapse “agree/strongly agree” and “disagree/strongly disagree.”
b BC5–BC10 percentages collapse “plausible/highly plausible” and “implausible/highly implausible.”
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evolutionary biological perspectives and much less receptive to
accounts of a conflictual human nature or alleged male pro-
pensity for sexual variety. Finally, majorities of women affirm
that Chagnon was ideologically motivated in his research (59%)
and that he unethically harmed the Yanomami (51%).
Plainly the field appears split into gendered groupings as well,
yet it turns out that political identity is comparably significant.
As indicated in table 1, anthropologists are overwhelmingly
liberal, with radicals and moderates collectively making up only
25% of our sample. Conservatives and libertarians constitute a
mere 2% of respondents—confirming Starn’s (2015) observation
that one is more likely to encounter “an anteater in a shopping
mall” than “aRepublican anthropologist” (14).9 Reviewing table 6,
we see that radicals differ significantly from their conservative
colleagues on 20 survey items (while liberals diverge on nine
Table 7. Ordinary least squares regression results
Survey item
Unstandardized coefficientsa,b
R2 n
Subfield Gender Political orientation
Archaeology Biology Culture Female Radical Liberal Moderate
Science and epistemology (SE):
SE1 .254 .416* .084 2.095 2.007 .308 .351 .087 283
SE2 .104 .192 .060 .011 .515* .645** .318 .058 282
SE3 .252 2.390 .328 .852** .401 .033 .248 .200 280
SE4 2.264 2.960** .030 .836** .526 .181 .295 .233 283
SE5 2.075 .287 2.074 2.212* 2.017 .158 .467 .056 276
SE6 .318 .310 2.027 .371** .627* .180 .254 .094 275
SE7 .400 1.095** 2.303 2.398** 2.492 .074 .130 .241 282
SE8 2.889** 21.272** 2.387 .238* .723* 2.026 2.016 .223 282
SE9 2.293 2.968** .007 .296* .748* .535* .554 .135 282
SE10 .441 .676** 2.090 2.539** 21.408** 2.695* 2.267 .209 286
Moral relativism and advocacy (MR):
MR1 .331* .159 .175 .019 .596** .546** .199 .069 294
MR2 .043 .058 2.002 .118 2.155 2.413 2.336 .014 294
MR3 .208 .153 2.292 2.118 .149 .202 .175 .063 294
MR4 2.210 2.214 2.573** .015 .555* .434 .368 .046 295
MR5 .059 2.021 .277 .164 .845** .385 2.023 .085 284
MR6 .297 .556* .105 2.483** 21.174** 2.279 2.040 .145 288
Biology and culture (BC):
BC1 2.267 2.841** .162 .542** .629* .144 .294 .163 278
BC2 .103 .591* 2.365 2.452** 2.460 2.011 2.199 .162 276
BC3 2.390 2.814** 2.226 2.178 .441 .295 2.054 .070 276
BC4 2.332 2.286 .078 .138 .583* .192 2.140 .087 275
BC5 2.209 2.353 .120 .111 .835* .325 2.009 .080 275
BC6 2.057 .130 2.215 2.455** 2.510 2.111 2.203 .080 273
BC7 .210 .661** .122 2.417** 2.455 .024 2.452 .128 270
BC8 2.126 .327 2.133 2.518** 2.940** 2.307 2.366 .135 269
BC9 2.363 2.620** 2.299 .104 .830** .614* .495 .065 263
BC10 2.089 .008 2.396 2.209* 21.038** 2.912** 2.530 .097 268
Controversial legacies (CL):
CL1 2.076 .006 .008 2.136 2.155 2.161 2.077 .014 255
CL2 .394* .378 .060 2.200* 2.724** 2.478* 2.360 .078 256
CL3 2.346 2.316 .040 2.037 .967** .789** .636* .071 256
CL4 2.004 .042 .250 2.195* 2.326 2.180 2.191 .044 259
CL5 2.296 2.998** .056 .565** .960** .347 .398 .214 258
CL6 .096 2.493* .322 .431** 1.165** .411 .272 .207 258
CL7 .429 .970** .053 2.340** 21.219** 2.533* 2.217 .238 257
CL8 .247 .822** .047 2.221* 2.049 .322 .707* .175 247
CL9 2.176 2.172 2.026 .013 2.130 2.026 2.002 .019 214
CL10 .024 2.043 .120 .070 .389 .083 2.095 .059 213
CL11 .042 2.017 2.062 .081 .128 .103 2.027 .029 207
CL12 2.294* 2.218 2.274* .053 .258 2.033 2.027 .045 211
a Intercept terms are not shown.
b Significance tests are one-tailed.
** P ! .01.
* P ! .05.
9. It is due to their sparse representation that we combine conservatives
and libertarians as the reference group in the political orientation models.
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and moderates on only two). Similar to females, radicals show
more sympathy for epistemological relativism, reporting stron-
ger support for postmodern theories, greater receptiveness to
removing “science” from the AAA’s long-range plan, and vir-
tually no interest in separating advocacy and fieldwork to pro-
tect objectivity. Radicals are significantly more likely to call for
solidarity with themarginalized groups that they study, and they
overwhelmingly reject the view that the AAA should not engage
in politically oriented activities.
With regard to biology, radicals again echo women in being
significantly more likely to reject evolutionary explanations of
“universal” features of human cultures (indeed, a slight majority
finds such attempts “misguided”). In pronounced contrast to
their colleagues, radicals decidedly reject the evolutionary psy-
chological chestnut of a male instinct for sexual variety (59%),
with a majority (55%) endorsing the plausibility of the view—
popularized by Ryan and Jethá (2010)—that polyamory char-
acterized prehistoric societies with little concern for paternity.
Finally, radicals were significantly more likely than their col-
leagues to reject the plausibility of a genetic component to
Ashkenazi intelligence.
Regarding the controversies, both radicals (and to a lesser
extent, liberals) were significantly more inclined to discard
Freeman’s (1983) attacks on Mead and deny his allegation that
she was duped by her Samoan informants. As to Chagnon,
radicals overwhelmingly affirm (82%) that he was ideologically
motivated to present a “bellicose” human nature (with zero
percent disagreement). Seventy-four percent believe that he
unethically harmed the Yanomami, and only 15% find credible
his sociobiological interpretation of the unokai. Note that each
of these items is statistically significant, vividly illustrating the
pattern of differences among subfield, gender, and political
groupings.
Space does not permit us to comment on all items. But we
encourage readers to examine the results closely and note that
even when items do not reach statistical significance, again and
again we see a consistent direction of responses by gender and
political orientation. To provide an explanation of these pro-
vocative findings, we will venture cautiously into the thorny
terrain of political psychology.
Discussion
Anthropology’s Emotive Communities: A Social
Intuitionist Interpretation
In a recent commentary, Glynn Custred (2016) applauds
Chagnon’s work while condemning what he sees as a radical
“faction” within anthropology, one that aims to transform the
field into a “politically correct university outpost.” Revitalizing
the “noble savage” myth, Custred decries, activists hope “to
sweep down thememory hole” research such as Chagnon’s that
reveals a deep history of human warfare. Regrettably, rather
than being open to “biological links” to human behavior,
“politicized anthropology” views any such link as “a heresy
that must be extirpated.”
In sharp contrast, Ryan and Jethá (2010) condemnChagnon
for “swashbuckling into Yanomami lands,” “inflaming” vio-
lence wherever he turns, and “seducing” readers with “tales of
derring-do among the vicious and violent ‘savages’ ” (223–227).
Our “bullshit detectors go off,” they declare—reproaching both
Chagnon and Steven Pinker (2011)—when scholars point to
“violent chimps and a few cherry-picked horticultural societies”
as evidence of “ancient tendencies toward warfare” (Ryan and
Jethá 2010:223–227)
Our findings in this study suggest that readers’ appraisals
of the above remarks likely reflect more than their knowledge
of human prehistory. Indeed, we suspect that for some their
attraction or aversion to Custred’s or Ryan and Jethá’s words
implicate their professional and personal identities and under-
lying emotional sensibilities. Consider our respondents’10 op-
posing views regarding the credibility of Chagnon’s work on
the reproductive success of Yanomami “killers”:
• Studies by many anthropologists have shown that his prem-
ises and use of statistics were very flawed.
• This is credible as this has been found in other human so-
cieties so has been replicated.
• This is one of the silliest arguments in anthropology. The
simple demographic fact is that “if you are killed whether by
male or female violence you do not contribute to the on-
going reproductive success of any group. End of argument”
(respondent’s quotes).
• Ridiculous question—missing the point—get with the cur-
rent concerns of indigenous peoples.
We received many such reactions pro et contra to most of
our survey items. This may be expected when examining
sensitive questions that have long vexed a field. Yet our aim
here is not so much to take sides in the controversies as to map
what we see as their underlying emotive dynamics. As we
stress, issues that push social scientists’ emotional buttons are
most likely to undermine empirical consensus. Even the facts
surrounding the 2010 AAA mission flap prove contentious.
Recall that we ask anthropologists whether the AAA’s proposal
to remove reference to “science” from its long-range plan was a
“worthy effort” (SE8). The event, however, hardly spurs con-
sensus regarding its basic details, much less its implications for
the discipline:
• The most important issue in anthropology today is the 2010
revision of the AAA representation of anthropology. It re-
moved science and evolution from its representation of the
discipline.
• It was horrible. It wounded us to such an extent that we are
still recuperating from it. What a mistake it was.
• It was and apparently is widely misunderstood. It was not a
major statement on the role of science but an attempt by
10. We were delighted to receive more than 1,000 remarks by an-
thropologists in the comment boxes across the 38 survey items.
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some to overly nuance the balance between what some
think of science (as pure) and others as more relative.
• This was a random clerical error that signaled nothing about
the AAA’s actual position.
• It was an oversight, a slip.
The “most important” issue in anthropology? A field still
“recuperating?” A “misunderstood” attempt for “nuance?” A
“clerical error?”
Such disparate interpretations show how even a single
event—should it tap the nerve of an academic community—
may elicit all manner of (re)constructions. Indeed, we suspect
that constructions of “science” in this quarrel serve as a proxy
for anthropologists’ respective group identities and moral
emotions. To sketch what we see as the emotive dynamics of
anthropology’s ongoing divisions, we draw tentatively from
current research in political psychology. We find Jonathan
Haidt and colleagues’ work on “social intuitionism,” elabo-
rated in “moral foundations theory” (MFT), to be especially
helpful in this regard (Haidt 2001, 2012; Haidt and Graham
2006; Haidt and Joseph 2004, 2007).
The literature on moral foundations is vast and growing
and is beyond our space here to unpack in detail (see Graham
et al. 2011 for an overview). As far as we know, however, our
studies are distinctive in applying MFT to the contours of social
scientific debates (Horowitz and Hughes 2017; Yaworsky,
Horowitz, and Kickham 2015). Our basic argument is that
scholars who share the same underlying moral emotions (or
intuitions) tend to gravitate (consciously or otherwise) toward
interpretive and emotive communities. Such communities
often draw from their disciplinary repertoires the same recipe
of methods and tools and interpret evidence in kindred ways.
This occasions in-group/out-group dynamics both within
their fields and without. This is not to deny, of course, the
centrality of the empirical in adjudicating social scientific
debates. Yet when it comes tomorally chargedmatters, such as
the controversies raised in our survey, contrasting intergroup
intuitions is more likely to be activated.
As an intuitive model of moral reasoning, MFT stresses that
people make judgments based on unconscious “flashes of ap-
proval or disapproval” toward morally charged affairs (Haidt
and Joseph 2004:56). Conscious deliberation comes afterward,
often serving to rationalize people’s automatic (gut) reactions.
Such automatic responses depend on people’s particular mix
of five moral foundations—specifically, their underlying intui-
tions regarding care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and sanctity.11
Haidt and colleagues find that people on the left-liberal end of
the political spectrum have a narrower moral template than
those on the right. Specifically, the twin foundations of care and
fairness saturate the political morality of the left. The template
of the political right, however, is broader and includes all five
intuitions.12 Hence care and fairness concerns are not the only
triggers on the right. Right-leaning people tendmuchmore than
those on the left to respect authority, value group loyalty, and
affirm purity with regard to conventional moral norms. While
the left is spring-loaded to challenge authority on behalf of the
vulnerable, the right honors hierarchical relationships and feels
more affinity to equity and tough-love sensibilities than the
egalitarian protectiveness of the left.
MFT views moral intuitions as inherited features of the
brain that are both innate and modular, although revised by
experience. The theory dovetails with a plethora of experi-
mental and psychological literature confirming the biological
roots of personality and consequent political orientation (e.g.,
Block and Block 2006; Hibbing, Alford, and Smith 2013; Jost
2009; Mooney 2012, 2014). As Mooney (2014) puts it, re-
ferring to a wave of new scientific evidence, “Long before they
become members of different parties, liberals and conservatives
appear to start out as different people.” Yet neither personality
nor politics are determined narrowly by the genes. People rather
are born “prewired” with certain characterological dispositions
that Haidt (drawing on Marcus 2004) calls a “first draft.” Life
experiences in interaction with the genes rewrite future drafts in
ways that enable innateness to coexist with wide developmental
malleability (Haidt and Joseph 2007).
Engaging the complexities of debate on the biocultural
underpinnings of personality and politics would bring us far
afield. Yet we have in mind the following speculative scenario
with regard to aspiring anthropologists. Their liberal-minded sen-
sibilities no doubt nudged them toward careers in academia—
after all, it is widely observed that liberals far outnumber conser-
vatives in university positions (Gross 2013). This is dramatically
so in cultural anthropology, where the ratio reportedly stands
at about 30∶1 (Gross and Simmons 2007). Once ensconced
in their graduate school subfields, they receive training in
the corresponding frameworks, conceptual tools, and practices
required to obtain their degrees. Such practices often nurture
disciplinary identity and a privileging of one’s academic turf,
especially in light of the investment expended to master its
techniques. Budding anthropologists are no doubt socialized
beyond formal techniques, however, to underlying scientific,
epistemological, and ethical assumptions. Indeed, we suspect
that the breadth of subdisciplinary socialization plays a role in
the marked contrast in responses we discovered between bi-
ological anthropologists and their (especially sociocultural)
colleagues.
Yet people are not merely vessels of their professional en-
culturation. Carrying different mixes of moral intuitions and
11. MFT holds that these intuitions have deep evolutionary roots,
meeting adaptive challenges in prehistory (e.g., reacting to human suf-
fering with care helps ensure kin survival; feeling group loyalty and
punishing traitors helps ensure advantage in the context of intergroup
competition for resources; etc.) See Haidt and Graham (2006) for dis-
cussion of their evolutionary argument.
12. On their web page, https://www.yourmorals.org/, Haidt and col-
leagues suggest a candidate for a sixth moral foundation as well: “liberty,”
but this intuition has not been as thoroughly developed or consistently
applied.
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experiences with them (and consequently varied political iden-
tities), we would expect—if MFT is correct regarding the role
of emotions in people’s judgments—that liberals and con-
servatives independent of subfield would differ in their inter-
pretations of morally charged evidence. Plainly, this is precisely
what we have discovered in our survey. Although we note above
that there is scarcely a conservative among anthropology’s ranks,
we do see that radicals (and to a lesser extent, liberals) differ
significantly from their colleagues on questions of epistemol-
ogy, advocacy, and the merits of evolutionary explanations.
Women follow suit in this regard.We should stress as well that
in contrast to radicals, liberals, and women, moderates diverge
significantly from their outlying conservative colleagues in
only two of the 38 survey items. This pattern suggests that
moral intuitions may indeed play a role in the field’s disparate
appraisals of controversial evidence.
Given a field predominated by left-liberal sensibilities, how
might intuitionism help explain why political identity and
gender are such reliable predictors of respondents’ varying
standpoints? The question of advocacy presents perhaps the
least difficulty. For MFT, the left’s acute sensitivity to care and
fairness suggests that actions or policies perceived to harm or
cheat the vulnerable are especially likely to trigger their moral
emotions. It is not surprising, hence, that left-wing scholars
who come together in emotive communities would reproduce
a discourse of moral responsibility toward subaltern groups.
This is only intensified in cultural anthropology, where the
ramifications of colonialism loom so large in the subject matter.
From this vantage point, we would anticipate much sympathy
for Scheper-Hughes’s call to her colleagues to stand in solidar-
ity with the marginalized groups they study (D’Andrade 1995;
Scheper-Hughes 1995). (Indeed, 78% of radicals in our survey
concur with the charge vs. 32%ofmoderates; table 5,MR5.) For
Scheper-Hughes, the legacies of colonialism—and the brutal
conditions that normalize, for example, maternal complacency
toward infant death—render the sacred cow of political disen-
gagement an utter abdication of ethical responsibility.
Of course the conventional critique of such engagement,
classically formulated by Weber (2009 [1917]), is that value
commitments distort the pursuit of truth: “When the man [sic]
of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full un-
derstanding of the facts ceases.”13 In his debate with Scheper-
Hughes, D’Andrade (1995:408) echoes Weber by arguing that
“moral” and “objective” models cannot be effectively wed in
science. “It’s nice to believe one can have both,” he notes, “but
the evidence is strong that one cannot” (408).
D’Andrade poses a stark choice: either we pursue objective
models of the world or we embrace moral models at the ex-
pense of such objectivity. Yet radical scholars have long chal-
lenged this premise. Might we be, as Engels wrote long ago,
utopian and scientific? Many of our respondents believe so—
one noting what she sees as a “false polarity” between advocacy
and objectivity, another opining: “I don’t see that they need to
be separate,” and so on. MFT, however, aligns closely with
Weber/D’Andrade. Not only are people typically unaware of
the moral intuitions coloring their judgments but also their
emotive communities tend to reinforce their biases in groupish
ways. “Morality binds and blinds,” Haidt (2012:218) writes, in
what he views as a foundational principle of moral psychology.
ForHaidt (2012), the blind spots of left academics can be seen
most clearly in their construction of “sacralized victims” (345).
Once a group is construed as sacred—be they ethnic, religious,
or other minorities, transgendered people, and so forth—it be-
comes much less likely to assess their circumstances accurately.
That is, whatever the facts may be, the left is trigger-ready to
interpret them in ways that avert potential harm to perceived
victims. It is in this context that we might understand the rel-
ative embrace of epistemological relativism by female and rad-
ical anthropologists. Consider item SE3: “On the whole, tradi-
tional indigenous knowledges regardingmedicine or cosmology
are no less ‘true’ than modern scientific explanations.”Virtually
half (49%) of the women in our sample agree with this, differing
significantly from the rest of the field. Forty-two percent of
radicals concur as well. In this case, knowledge of the disparate
treatment afforded to native peoples over the centuries may act
as powerful “primers,” nudging them into vocalizing support for
a proposition that places indigenous culture on equal footing
with Western society. Yet is it the case that indigenous under-
standings of medicine or cosmology are no less accurate than
modern scientific accounts? No progress has been made by
Western science in these arenas that has surpassed indigenous
knowledge? Although we are reluctant to take sides in this
study—we aim to understand ideology and notmerely critique
it—this extraordinary claim seems uninterpretable without
the tools of intuitionist social psychology.
Females and radicals are significantly more likely than their
colleagues to agree with item SE6 as well: “Anthropologists’
depictions of indigenous cultures reflect more their own power
and interests as knowledge producers than ‘true’ descriptions of
the reality of those cultures.” Notice the scare quotes and es-
sential doubt regarding any scientific approximations of “truth”
in both of these survey items. Recall, however, that anthro-
pologists (including women and radicals) overwhelmingly af-
firm that scientific advances have improved human well-being
over the years (SE1) and that society would be better off by
heeding the consensus views of scientists in public policy (SE2).
Respondents again and again comment unprompted about
climate change in this regard, acknowledging that scientific
practice, despite fits and starts, produces accurate knowledge
over time.
It would be easy to call out our anthropology colleagues for
contradictory views here. How can science make long-term
advances that benefit society with knowledge claims regarding
medicine or cosmology as relative or timeless as indigenous
folklore? Perhaps sensing their epistemological ambivalence,
13. Weber’s position is actually a bit more subtle, unsurprisingly, in that
he argues that chosen scientific questions themselves have moral “pre-
suppositions,” such as their worthiness of being known. Yet he plainly en-
dorses a dispassionate orientation to research and teaching in practice.
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respondents stress contextual considerations in endorsing
scientific consensus:
• Climate change today, yes; cigarette smoking in the 1950s,
no.
• Some policy areas are more firmly graspable via scientific
methods than others. Climate change: yes. Easing of income
inequality: not so much. Eradication of racial discrimina-
tion: probably not at all.
• Pharmaceutical company–sponsored randomized control
trials?When it comes to climate change yes, but tell a woman
that mammography actually does not produce the results
they imagine.
• Science is particularly good at some types of truthiness. But
there are other approaches to knowledge that are more valid
when it comes to science’s blind spots.
We fully concur that science is all too often distorted by
corporate and political forces that fund and harness it around
their interests. Yet we wonder if statements like these conflate
the method of science with its socially corrupting embedded-
ness in wider fields of societal power and interests. We agree
that coming to consensus on social scientific questions of in-
equality or racial discrimination is much more difficult due to
broader power relations and entrenched ideological divisions
(the underpinnings of which we have only tentatively sketched
in this report). Yet to bend the stick so far as the respondent does
above—that science is good at “some types of truthiness” but
that there are other “more valid” approaches to knowledge—
strikes us as wholly unconvincing without identifying the epis-
temological grounds for consenting to such approaches.
The question of alternative epistemologymay jog the reader’s
memory of our discussion of the Menchú/Stoll controversy
described above. Recall that Stoll was widely condemned for
uncovering misrepresentations in Menchú’s testimonio. The
reactions were surely understandable at the time. In the context
of a brutal civil war, where hundreds of thousands perished,
Menchú and her family suffered grievously but Stoll not so. It is
hardly surprising in this setting that the progressive community
would close ranks around Menchú—a “sacred” symbol of peas-
ant resistance—and attempt to “purge” ideas that threatened to
sully her reputation. Indeed, Stoll’s attempt at an “authoritative”
account of Menchú’s life was all the more galling to progressive
sensibilities given his status as a privileged Western observer.14
In MFT terms, the suddenly in-vogue descriptions of testi-
monio as a collective enterprise of “multiple positionalities,” or
“ways of knowing,”may be seen as ad hoc rationalizations of the
fictitious elements in Menchú’s story (recounted in Burgos-
Debray 1983). As part of the left-liberal camp ourselves, we
should stress that we sympathize deeply with the collective
anguish that likely spurred such rationalizations. We appreciate
as well the respondent who grants that Menchú’s exaggerations
were a “problem” but that they should be seen “as reflecting the
limits of reaching a public that had ignored the genocide against
Maya villages then going on in Guatemala.” We by no means
believe that there is a pat answer regarding how and when social
scientific or other knowledge should be divulged, should such
disclosures have predictably injurious consequences in dire
historical circumstances. Yet we find it critical not to let our
piqued sensitivities “bind and blind” us, as Haidt would put it,
into abandoning the scientific pursuit of truth. “Nomatter how
sympathetic a figure is,” one respondent notes, “it is important
to report the facts, and not let sympathy lead researchers into
rhetorical poses that romanticize their subjects.”
Arguably the most famous critic of the romanticization of the
indigenous in recent years is Steven Pinker (2011, 2016). Pinker
assails the Rousseauian doctrine of the noble savage, highlighting
wide-ranging literature in evolutionary biology, anthropology,
and paleontology on the prehistoric roots of violence and war.
The claimhas proved quite divisive in social science today (as has
Pinker himself) and unsurprisingly has polarized our survey
results. Once again we see females and radicals in our sample
standing apart from their colleagues. They are least receptive
to the claim that tribal conflict was “a principal selective force
in human nature” (BC6) and most receptive to the idea that
prehistoric foraging societies were sexually permissive (BC9) and
“more peaceful than later agricultural or industrial societies”
(BC5). As noted above, females and radicals are less inclined to
welcome evolutionary explanations of human cultures, with
many rejecting widely endorsed propositions in evolutionary
psychology. Indeed, a majority of radical anthropologists do
not find plausible even the uncontroversial view that natural
selection shaped humans’ taste for foods with fat and sugar
(BC7). It is hardly surprising then that a mere 9% would find
plausible the view of an evolved male impulse for greater sexual
variety than women (BC8).
We have reflected elsewhere on the likely emotive under-
pinnings of left academics’ resistance to evolutionary psychol-
ogy (Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham 2014; see also Jonason
and Schmitt 2016). Suffice to note that although claims regarding
evolved, adaptive roots of current human behaviors cannot be
tested experimentally—inviting their widespread dismissals by
detractors as “just-so” stories (e.g., Gould 1997; Kimmel 2004)—
from a moral foundations perspective, more is going on than
simply intellectual disagreement about the credibility of avail-
able evidence. It appears that acknowledging an instinctual
component of darker aspects of human nature (e.g., intergroup
violence, sexual possessiveness) runs headlong into the left’s
intergroup identities and underlying collective emotions. As
committed egalitarians, attuned deeply to the intuitions of care
and fairness, ideas that appear to them to naturalize hierarchy or
reward violence in any way trigger mechanical dismissal. The
comparatively frosty appraisals of Chagnon’s legacy by radicals
(and to a lesser extent, liberals) can certainly be interpreted in
this light.
14. Although we did not have enough respondents to gauge statistical
significance, consistent with expectations we found that radical anthropol-
ogists were more likely to find Stoll’s research “reprehensible.”
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Although the gendered differences in responses to our
questions were significant and widespread, to date, MFT has
little to say on gender. We find this puzzling. A wide-ranging
study (Graham et al. 2011) finds that women reveal significantly
greater sensitivity than men to care and harm concerns when
rendering moral judgments.15 Yet theorizing the reasons why
lags in MFT. Some cognitive scientists (Baron-Cohen 2009; see
also Christov-Moore et al. 2014) argue controversially that av-
erage differences by gender in the experience of empathy and
compassion are in part innate and have evolutionary biological
roots. This view need not contradict traditional social scientific
emphases on cultural factors and socialization, even among
sociobiologists. Hrdy (1999), for example, views female nur-
turing strategies, even those directed toward their own offspring,
as calculated, context dependent, and subject to the forces of
culture. Whatever its biological, cultural, or interactive roots, a
keener intuitive sensitivity to care and harm amongwomenmay
help explain the distinct gendered results in our survey.
Unsurprisingly, radicals were significantly less likely to en-
tertain the most delicate items in our survey bearing on the
potential reality of “race.” As discussed above, the field over-
whelmingly denies a biological reality to race (BC3) and believes
that “attempts to discover a genetic component to behavioral
differences between ‘racial’ groups are bound to fail” (BC4).
Anthropologists are deeply skeptical as well of a genetic com-
ponent of the comparatively high IQ scores of Ashkenazi Jews
(BC10). We hardly wish to pull the tiger’s tail in our final
thoughts, nor do we endorse the view of biological races.16 How-
ever, notwithstanding the complexity and sensitivity of these
issues, we wonder about the extent to whichmoral intuitions and
disciplinary identities may render off limits even measured in-
quiry into these matters.17 The “racialist” arguments made by
science writer NicholasWade (2015), for example, have struck a
deep nerve as evidenced by the joint letter by 143 academicians
rebuking his book (Coop et al. 2014). We do not have the space
to elaborate further on the matter. We should note, however,
that there is less consensus among anthropologists globally on
the disutility of the race concept than there is in the United
States and Western Europe (see Štrkalj 2007).
Concluding Remarks
Some two decades after the science wars, we have aimed in this
study to take stock of the field of anthropology. Although we
have been loath to take sides in the controversies discussed, we
hardly see ourselves on an enlightened perch above the fray of
collective dispute. In fact, a chief limitation of this kind of
study is that we do not carry out the hard work of engaging
these contentious issues empirically. Although we appear to
upbraid our fellow left-liberal colleagues for potential blind
spots, by no means do we view their respective positions on
these controversies as necessarily wrong. Indeed, we believe
that the empirical chips should fall where they may—some-
thing that we hope is more likely to the extent that academics
across the political spectrum recognize the tugs of their own
moral intuitions and intergroup identities when gauging evi-
dence. This can only aid in the pursuit of truth and consequent
scientific consensus, to which we remain wholly committed. In
today’s highly polarized political climate, a better grasp of the
underpinnings of ideology—both inside and outside of aca-
demia—is sorely needed. We hope our report inspires future
inquiry of this nature.
Comments
R. Brian Ferguson
Graduate Program in Peace and Conflict Studies, Rutgers University,
603 Hill Hall, Newark, New Jersey 07102, USA (bfergusn@newark
.rutgers.edu). 13 X 18
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham (HYK) confirm that almost
all anthropologists position themselves from the center to the
left end of the political spectrum. Among anthropologists they
find significant differences by gender, political orientation, and
subdisciplinary specialization in attitudes toward science, epis-
temology, advocacy, and “evolutionary biological explanations,”
and toward recent controversies that involve those broader
issues. Their findings are interesting, although not surprising,
and it is good to have some data.
HYK followmoral foundations theory (MFT), which proposes
specific cognitive orientations that are “innate and modular,
although revised by experience,” differentiating liberals from
conservatives. Much work is ongoing about the evolution of
humanmoral sensibility, and about neurobiological substrates of
political orientations, from many diverse perspectives. MFT
aligns with evolutionary psychology, an approach that has been
critiqued for its concept of massive modularity, its approach to
evolutionary process, and its lack of support from genetics,
neurobiology, and cognitive science. Criticism has been directed
15. Graham et al.’s (2011) international database of 49,428 women
and 68,812 men found that women were significantly more concerned
than men about harm, fairness, and purity, while men evinced slightly
higher concern for in-group loyalty and authority.
16. We concur with the anthropological consensus, going back most
prominently to Boas (1912), discarding the notion of races asfixed or natural
categories. Clinal studies support this conclusion, as do most contemporary
anthropologists (seeWagner et al. 2016). Of course, scientists who favor the
concept often point to its utility in forensic analysis (Gill 2000). They also
highlight continental “clusters” of traits that for “racial realists” matter as
much as clines (Wade 2015).
17. The following are only a handful of the responses revealing
anthropologists’ widespread aversion to these questions: “As an Ashkenazi
Jew, I really hate this argument,” “This is a racist question,” and “It would
take pages to explain my objections to this question.” We should add that
there were a comparable number of respondents who suggested that the
research is not available or settled on the matter.
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at MFT specifically (Suhler and Churchland 2011), of course
with rebuttal. So Haidt and Joseph (2011) respond to Suhler and
Churchland that they “have always treated moral modules as
functional modules, not as physical, anatomical or neurobio-
logical modules” (2119). I am generally skeptical about innate
modularity of complex cognition and approaches based on that
premise. But I do not understand how this theoretical orientation
even applies to the data on hand? It is not about liberals versus
conservatives but rather self-identified moderates, liberals, and
radicals, plus gender and disciplinary specialization.
HYK elide attitudes about evolutionary or biological ap-
proaches to culture and behavior, with being pro- or antiscience.
No anthropologist is skeptical about evolutionary approaches
to evolution. The skepticism—I think—is about sociobiology,
evolutionary psychology, and the simplistic biologisms so com-
mon today. Genes widely publicized as affecting abusive be-
havior (MAOA) and depression (5-HTTLPR) were later found
to be, in those applications, nonexplanatory (Haberstick et al.
2014:25; Risch et al. 2009). Oxytocin, the famous trust hormone,
in meta-analysis is not reliably associated with trust (Nave
2015:772). Even for the language gene, FOXP2, its supposed
sweep of human populations was just found to be an inaccurate
result of the earlier sample. “New hypothesis for language
evolution needed!” (Atkinson et al. 2018). The list is easily ex-
tended. Many claimed biological breakthroughs about human
behavior have been walked back.
Single genes are not the same as the evolved cognitive mod-
ules. Even if conceptualized as predispositions to learn rather
than hardwiring, those are much more complex multigenic
traits that are far less subject to confirmation or investigation
by contemporary physical sciences. Skepticism about them as
evolved adaptations is not antiscience but is rather consistent
with much research on neurobiological developmental plastic-
ity, systemically interacting with environment at many levels.
HYK frame opinions about recent anthropological contro-
versies as differentiating commitment to science, from “post-
modern sentiments [that] endure in the discipline, undermining
scientists’ commitment to objectivity and capacity for dispas-
sionate approximations of ‘truth.’ ” Women and leftists situate
themselves in moral communities that may “bind and blind”
them into “abandoning the scientific pursuit of truth.” “It ap-
pears that acknowledging an instinctual component of darker
aspects of human nature (e.g., intergroup violence, sexual pos-
sessiveness) runs headlong into the left’s intergroup identities
and underlying collective emotions.”
Sexual possessiveness falls within a larger discussion of gen-
der differences. I would hazard, without statistics, that female
anthropologists have greater interest in that topic than males.
For those who study this area, there are sober, scientific, bio-
social (beginning with the body) alternatives to evolved predis-
positions for allmanner of gender specializations, including cross-
culturally commonmale efforts to control female sexuality (Eagly
and Wood 2003). There may be greater awareness of excesses of
proclaimed evolutionary science, such as men having an evolved
psychological module for rape (Travis 2003). They may know
better that sociobiology was employed from the get-go to un-
dermine feminist objectives (Gould 1978). They are probably
more attuned to the androcentrism of Chagnon’s portrayal of
Yanomami. These are all good reasons for skepticism.
Skepticism of “tribal conflict” as “a principal selective force that
shaped human nature,” or the “instinctual component of . . .
intergroup violence” is not antiscientific, although it is regularly
tarred as political correctness. Dispassionate investigation from
phylogeny (Gomez et al. 2016), archaeology (Ferguson 2013a,
2013b), and ethnology (Fry and Soderberg 2014) soundly refutes
the evolutionary position of ubiquitous war through our species’
past. (On Chagnon’s role in fomenting conflict among Yano-
mami, and the validity of his claims of higher reproductive
success, see Ferguson 2015b; on the scientific status of Cochran
et al. [2006] on Ashkenazi intelligence, see Ferguson, unpub-
lished manuscript, 2008).
HYK do not evaluate the merits of particular positions not
relevant to their study. Certainly most anthropologists do not
know the details of controversies. General reactions are shaped
by their larger orientations, as HYK propose. The troubling
subtext is how these findings will be read and cited.
The takeaway for many will be that criticism of such bio-
logical or evolutionary positions by anthropologists is political,
not scientific. That is the standard refrain of sociobiologists
and evolutionary psychologists. This article facilitates a polit-
ical defense of positions that are challenged on empirical and
theoretical grounds. Informed skepticism about general research
orientations and rigorous criticism about particular findings
based on those orientations is not antiscience, but practic-
ing science.
Douglas P. Fry and Geneviève Souillac
Department of Anthropology, University of Alabama at Bir-
mingham, Birmingham, Alabama 35205, USA (dfry@uab.edu).
14 IX 18
We wish to thank the authors for their thought-provoking
article. Whether considering the researchers’ assessments of
specific controversies or the more general items of the survey,
we think that the main takeaway message is the need for se-
rious self-reflectionwithin our discipline. In seeing thesefindings
as a call for self-contemplation by anthropologists, we are not
advocating the return to the ’90s style of book forewords that
divulged information about authors, but rather we are calling
for serious self-reflection about assumptions, cultural beliefs,
theory, training, and disciplinary history and how such factors
influence the thinking and practice of anthropological science
and scholarship.
One way to deal with biases is to regularly critique one’s own
assumptions, motives, methods, and interpretations beforeman-
uscripts even go out for peer review. Clearly, a host of personal
features, cultural beliefs, and theoretical biases can creep into
research and interpretive processes. It could be useful if
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anthropologists applied their knowledge about the learning and
transmission of shared beliefs to their own academic thinking
and writing. In considering the differences regarding respon-
dents’ subdisciplines, genders, and political orientations, Horo-
witz, Yaworsky, and Kickham offer an interpretation based on
how scholars who share underlying moral emotions “tend to
gravitate (consciously or unconsciously) toward interpretive and
emotive communities.”Thismaybe true, butwewonderwhether
it might be useful to conceptualize the survey results as reflecting
variations of belief systems, or different academic milieux, de-
pending on subfield, gender, or political views, that is, to apply
anthropological constructs to anthropologists themselves.
The type of self-reflective questions we think could be
useful for a scientist or scholar include: Do I really have hard
data to back up my interpretations? Are my methodological
decisions as unbiased as possible? What would a skeptic say
about my techniques and interpretations that would be valid
points to consider?
The survey findings show anthropologists to be split on the
item about peacefulness in prehistory prior to the development
of agriculture. This is an area that we think could benefit from
greater attention by researchers to the history and philosophy
of science; a careful scrutiny of sampling, methods, and in-
terpretations; a holistic consideration of multiple data types
(e.g., Holocene archaeological sequences on the origins of war,
social complexity, ecology and demography, nomadic forager
social organization, the ethology of mammalian aggression
and restraint, and so on); and last but not least, honest self-
reflection—to the greatest degree possible—about one’s own
biases, motivations, and assumptions. If the goal in science is
the pursuit of truth and understanding, then publications that
draw upon cherry-picked samples, misrepresent the nature
of the data, muddle key concepts, or ignore contradictory
findings harm the practice of science and the field of anthro-
pology (see Fry 2013, 2018; Fry and Söderberg 2014).
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham also report that anthro-
pologists remain divided regarding what to make of Napoleon
Chagnon’s (1988) claim that Yanomamö killers have more off-
spring. In his memoirs, Chagnon (2013) criticizes his anthro-
pological colleagues for being biased and unscientific, but he does
not engage in the type of self-reflections that could benefit the
practice of science. Chagnon (2013) simply republishes the
original killers-have-more-kids findings without any serious
engagement with the methodological, mathematical, and in-
terpretive critiques of his original study (e.g., Albert 1989; Fer-
guson 1989, 1995; Fry 2006; Lizot and Dart 1994; Miklikowska
and Fry 2012; Moore 1990) and without any mention of studies
on the Waorani and the Cheyenne that report the opposite of
his Yanomamö findings—namely, that killers leave fewer off-
spring than nonkillers (Beckerman et al. 2009; Moore 1990).
Chagnon (2013) shows no willingness to rethink his original
methods or interpretations in light of various kinds of critiques
and subsequent findings reported over a 25-year period.Whereas
closed-mindedness is antithetical to good science, the striving
by researchers for high standards, self-awareness, and con-
sciousness about their own motivations and biases can aid the
scientific endeavor.
Charles Darwin, as he contemplated and gathered various
kinds of data in support of his theory of evolution through natural
selection, did engage in self-critique and self-reflection. Darwin
([1887] 1958) insightfully realized his own tendency to dismiss
observations that seemed to be unsupportive of his theorizing,
writing in his autobiography, “I had, also, during many years,
followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever a published fact,
a new observation or thought came across me, which was op-
posed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it
without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such
facts and thoughtswere farmore apt to escape from thememory
than favorable ones” (123). We think anthropologists could
learn from Darwin’s mindful and meticulous approach. Un-
fortunately, today one does not have to look very far to find
examples of writers selectively including only material that
matches their arguments or that corresponds with their pet
speculations, while simultaneously ignoring or even misrep-
resenting findings that contradict their views.
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham point out that according
to moral foundations theory, people are typically unaware of
the moral intuitions affecting their judgment. While not a
panacea, we suggest that researchers can regularly ask them-
selves self-reflective questions and in so doing become less
biased: What are my personal biases (political, cultural, theo-
retical, and so on)? Why do I have these biases? How did I get
them? What implicit assumptions do I hold on the topics I
study? How does the history of my subdiscipline and my train-
ing milieu in particular affect my thinking? What motivates
me to do my science or scholarship? In my work, how can I use
the most rigorous scholarship and methods? Am I true to
seeking the truth, or do other factors influencemy thinking and
motivations (fame, glory, winning a debate, etc.)? How open
am I to changing my mind when presented with new data or
new interpretations that better fit the facts?
William Jankowiak
Department of Anthropology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89154, USA (jankbill@unlv.nevada.edu). 24 VIII 18
Academia, like most communities that are conscious of being
a community, seldom enjoys being the subject of an analyt-
ical critique that reveals tacit bias and unvoiced, albeit often
acted upon, political positions. This is especially so when that
community frequently claims it is a society of concerned
thinkers interested in the discovery of truth. But what is
truth, Pontius Pilate asked Jesus?
In this thoughtful overview, the authors provide us with a
road map of tacit predispositions that many academics bring
to the analysis of their own data as well as those of others. In
the resulting intramural scrimmage, we are asked to once again
revisit MaxWeber’s masterful analysis of the role of objectivity
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in the social sciences. Roy D’Andrade in his 1995 Current An-
thropology article sought to prod the field into reengaging with
Weber’s firm conviction that objective analysis can exist within
a moral universe. His call for an open dialogue was overwhelm-
ingly greeted with the reassertion that the best most “objective”
analysis acts as a moral defense of the people we study. The
implication is that because truth is socially constructed, we
should focus on what we deem to be moral truths, which are
objective enough.
Given that Donald Trump is the first postmodern president
to not only embrace the relativity of truth but also advance the
subjectivity of truth, that is, whatever he wants it to be, en-
dorsed by a recent Trump spokesperson who informed us that
the “truth isn’t truth,” (Moore 2018) it should come as a re-
freshing reminder that when taken to extremes, such a slippery
view renders impossible any objective study to identify be-
havioral patterns and the reasons for their appearance, con-
tinuation, and disappearance. In an increasingly insecure
culture where the nature of truth is up for grabs, we as a dis-
cipline may be devolving into little more than some kind of
association grounded in the ethics of social justice and defined
by the instability of our often-shifting core values and personal
preferences.
Here the authors are spot-on in recognizing that we have
formed competing epistemological tribes that talk past each
other—if we can assume that another person is even listening.
We no longer argue with interpretations that we disagree with
but rather refuse to recognize that those interpretations were
ever published or even exist. In the intramural back and forth,
we have lost the benefit of being intellectually pushed out of
our comfort zones. This raises an important and troubling
question: Is there any meaningful benefit to having a multi-
plicity of perspectives? The answer should be of course there is,
but it currently does not go without saying; it happens only if
we actually talk to each other and not disengage or dismiss
views and interpretations for which we have no sympathy.
The authors are furthermore correct in showing that one of
the core dividing lines derives from our persistent skepticism
about the value of biology in contributing to the understanding
of human behavior. The ongoing withdrawal from, when not
outright rejection of, the psychoanalytical paradigm has landed
anthropology on the shakiest of terrain—a discipline with a
once historically articulatedmission to study both the subjective
and objective dimensions of human behavior is now erratic in its
attitudes and benighted in its mission.
A few anthropologists adopted a cognitive model of the mind,
but this approach does not seem to have attracted a wide interest
or dependable focus, thus leaving it on the discipline’s periphery.
Given the absence of a viable conceptual framework for probing
the subjective sphere of the mental life, it is not surprising (al-
though it does seem to have surprised many) that evolutionary
psychology gradually replaced the Freudian paradigm.Over time
the evolutionary approach brought biology back prominently
into the equation. For most cultural anthropologists, the rein-
troduction of biology, no matter how seemingly valid, was
greeted with intense, almost irrational, resistance, accompa-
nied by an insistence that there is nothing new to examine or
reinterpret because everything is social and that is that. The by-
product of rejecting psychoanalytical and evolutionary anal-
ysis has left us without an agreed-upon “psychology of hu-
manness.” By default, most of the field is stymied by some de
facto tabula rasa (publicly rejected while privately tolerated)
that elevates social structure or society over everything else.
Since societal forces accordingly shaped everything, there was
no need to engage with psychological research or its findings.
But without concurrence of conceptual framework or language
in which to discuss the subjective sphere, many anthropol-
ogists have been inclined to sidestep, if not reject, the explo-
ration of the subjective in favor of personalized ethics.
The retreat into conceptual or, in the authors’ words, moral
emotional camps of epistemological faith has resulted in a di-
lution of intellectual skepticism, diminishing the willingness to
question underlying assumptions and the conclusions that fol-
low from them. A new kind of cultural anthropology has taken
over: a morally engaged social activism.
The authors’ survey further reveals that this shift in in-
tellectual orientation wears a political and gendered face. The
authors do not comment on this, but I suspect that the po-
litical orientation wears an additional face: one of class. It is
increasingly more common in research universities, and es-
pecially Ivy League institutions, than it is in rank-and-file
state universities. An important question has come into play:
Do we assess a person’s character by how he or she views the
world? That is, if we identify with the view, do we therefore
think highly of the person? Or if we do we not agree with the
view, do we therefore think little of the person?
If so, can we as a discipline objectively analyze the work of
people whose theoretical orientations we do not like? This
should not be surprising, given that our political and social
identities have merged together so that one predicts the other,
so one depends on the other.
Given these personalized analytical preferences, we are
faced with a practical issue: How can journal submissions
receive a more balanced and useful review? After reading this
modest and thoughtful analysis, I wonder whether editors,
when selecting reviewers, should not take into consideration
a reviewer’s political orientation as well as his or her given
expertise. I also wonder whether, 20 years from now, Current
Anthropology will once again publish papers dealing with the
field’s reluctance to engage Weber’s challenge to distinguish
the personal from the objective.
Peter N. Peregrine
Department of Anthropology, Lawrence University, 711 East Boldt
Way, Appleton, Wisconsin 54911, USA (peter.n.peregrine@
lawrence.edu). 16 VIII 18
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham have provided an interest-
ing picture of the continuing division between proscience and
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antiscience factions within anthropology. As they note, the re-
moval of the term “science” from the American Anthropolog-
ical Association’s (AAA) mission statement as it was presented
in the 2010 Long Range Planning Committee (LRPC) report
was the catalyst for a vocal critique of the AAA and its leader-
ship. An important issue that the controversy focused on was
AAA leadership, a focus that Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kick-
ham do not carefully examine.What I provide here is a personal
and admittedly subjective history of the growing frustration
with AAA leadership that played a seminal role in the 2010
controversy.
Conflict with AAA leadership simmered throughout the
Darkness in El Dorado controversy and boiled over in 2002
when the AAA’s executive board (EB) accepted the Darkness
in El Dorado task force’s report. The report violated the very
ethics guidelines that supposedly underlay the task force’s
work, and one only needs to read Anthropology News from
2002 and 2003 to see that many AAA members viewed the
report not only as damaging to the AAA’s reputation but also
as creating distrust of anthropologists among indigenous
communities and potentially undermining efforts to carry out
large-scale inoculation programs.
Accepting the task force report was not the only divisive
action made by AAA leadership in 2002. Another such action
involved the rejection of several scientific panels—panels having
National Academy members and other senior anthropologists
as organizers or presenters—which were subsequently left out
of the program for the 2002 annual meeting in New Orleans. In
response, a group of disgruntled anthropologists organized a
salon des refusés meeting held parallel to the AAA meetings
and made up of the rejected panels and several others. AAA
leadership was not happy about this, and some members ex-
pressed their displeasure in impolitic ways. The direct result
was the creation of the Society for Anthropological Sciences
(SASci) and amovement to create a separate section within the
AAA for scientific anthropology (in part because sections were
allowed two symposia at the annual meeting).
In 2003, a resolution was put forward that repudiated the
accusation that Napoleon Chagnon and James Neel had fos-
tered a measles epidemic among the Yanomami. The resolution
caused considerable debate within the AAA and in fact was
declared null and void by the EB due to errors in its wording,
although swirling gossip suggested that the EB did not want
the resolution introduced because of pressure from the task
force and several members who held personal grudges against
Chagnon. Significantly, when the resolution was reintroduced
it passed overwhelmingly—1,526 to 134—suggesting that AAA
leadership either was either out of touch with the members or
being disproportionally influenced by a small group of members
working to keep the resolution from being introduced.
The following year, concerns about small groups influencing
leadership expanded when the EB decided to move the annual
meeting from San Francisco to Atlanta without consulting
section leadership. The move had reasoning behind it—the
conference hotel had locked out its unionized workers in a labor
dispute, and unionized AAA members refused to attend the
meeting and raised the issue that the AAA should side with
labor and not management in this dispute. There was a ballot
and the move did pass. But the vote was done quickly, sent only
to those who had registered for the meeting, and had a very low
response rate. The impact on attendees, particularly graduate
students and contingent faculty, was dramatic, as was the fi-
nancial impact on the AAA itself due to canceled contracts
with the Hilton Corporation. The decision to move the meeting
suggested that AAA leadership had become more interested in
social activism than in representing the needs of its members
(again, all one needs to do is skim through Anthropology News
for the months following the meeting to see how strong the
concerns over leadership had become).
For five years, SASci worked with AAA to create a section.
This proved more difficult than expected. Vigorous pushback
came from several members of the EB, who argued that an-
thropology was a science and that there was no reason for such
a society under the AAA umbrella. In essence, their argument
was that the AAA was already a society for anthropological
sciences, but despite this pushback the Society for Anthropo-
logical Sciences (SAS—organizationally separate from SASci,
although in practice the same) became a provisional section of
the AAA in 2007.
In SAS’s first Anthropology News column, Stephen Lyon
(2008) explained why SAS was created: “The new section is an
important addition toward fulfilling the AAA mission to pro-
mote anthropological sciences.” Two years later, the LRPC re-
moved the word “science” from the AAAmission statement. As
then-president of SAS, I viewed this removal as not only an at-
tack on scientific methods in anthropology but also a direct at-
tack on the newly created SAS. We were a “provisional” section
at that point, one that at least some members of the EB disliked
and I feared might act to remove—if science were no longer part
of the AAA mission, then why have SAS as part of the AAA?
For me, the “science” controversy was as much about a
decade-long bias in AAA leadership as it was about divisions
among AAA membership. Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham
illustrate that divisions among anthropologists still exist and
are a cause for concern, but that is only one aspect of the bigger
story behind the controversy. The failure of AAA leadership to
balance these divisions was equally to blame.
Peter Wood
National Association of Scholars, 420 Madison Avenue, 7th Floor,
New York, New York 10017, USA (pwood@nas.org). 6 IX 18
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham question whether an-
thropology is “divided between proscience and antiscience
factions.” Their primary evidence is survey questions framed
in “familiar and unambiguous language.”
“Familiar” and “unambiguous” are not the same thing. The
first question asks whether respondents agree that “scientific
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advances have improved well-being.” An overwhelming ma-
jority (89%) responded positively. On its face, that puts to rest
the claim that anthropology has fractured between pro- and
antiscience factions.
But that large majority masks deep divisions in all three key
terms: science, advances, and well-being. Someone who agrees
with the proposition that advances in plant science have im-
proved food security and human nourishment might well dis-
agree with the proposition that advances in the scientific study
of kinship systems during the colonial era improved the ad-
ministration of colonial law and the welfare of subject popula-
tions. The disagreement in this case is not merely a matter of
the substantive claims. It involves different ideas of science, ad-
vances, and well-being.
The ambiguities go even deeper. Some anthropologists hold
that ethnographic approaches that emphasize the emotions,
personal insights, and experiences of the fieldworker are an
advance in the science of anthropology that benefits the sub-
jects of research. Other anthropologists decry such methods as
profoundly unscientific. Are “interpretive ethnographies” a form
of “science,” or are they a branch of imaginative literature?
The word “science” generally retains positive connotations,
and even those who reject much of what science has entailed
historically may fancy themselves in favor of “science” as
something taking place in a laboratory or as a general rubric
for their own not-very-scientific work. “Science” conceived as
something so elastic as to encompass nearly any practice is not
science. The “science” of palm reading is not science.
The basic thesis of the article is thus doubtful, although the
authors go on to offer much of interest. Horowitz, Yaworsky,
and Kickham evoke the divisions among anthropologists over
how “engaged” the discipline should be with power, political
responsibility, and “authoritative representations.” Their treat-
ments of the controversies over Chagnon, Stoll, and Freeman
are framed as efforts not “to adjudicate conflicting claims” but
to disentangle “the empirical and the normative” elements in the
disputes. In this effort they are moderately successful, although
Sahlins’s denunciation of Chagnon’s field methods, Pratt’s
(and others’) rebukes to Stoll, and Shankman’s attack on Free-
man are presented as though their points remained unanswered.
Granted it was not the authors’ goal to give a rounded picture of
these controversies but rather to provide a springboard to a key
question: Does distrust toward scientific objectivity characterize
contemporary anthropology? Their summary of the Chagnon,
Stoll, and Freeman affairs strongly suggests that the answer is yes,
at least for a prominent segment of the anthropological com-
munity—notwithstanding the overall results of their survey.
Their survey does, nevertheless, provide a valuable index of
how deeply antiscience epistemology has rooted itself in the
discipline. That nearly one-third (31%) of anthropologists hold
that indigenous cosmologies are “no less” true than modern
scientific explanations is astonishing. If we look at the American
academy at large, we know where we are most likely to find
faculty members who believe that witchcraft explains infectious
disease to a degree comparable with microbes; that sorcery ex-
plains success in growing food crops at least aswell as seed stock,
fertilizing, and adequate irrigation; and that various deities ex-
plain the apparentmotion of the planets and stars at least as well
as modern astronomy. Do 31% of anthropologists really uphold
this sort of crude relativism?
I suspect that a much smaller percentage would stake their
health or their lives on the “truth” of Azande medicine or
Trobriand garden magic, but the willingness of so many to
affirm “no less true” in response to a survey question plainly
registers a widespread social attitude. The authors draw from
this the bland observation that “the ambivalence of the field
regarding epistemology is unmistakable.” They also capture
the contradiction between the strong relativistic stand on
“indigenous cosmologies” and the emphatic support (89%) for
the UNDeclaration of Human Rights, although the percentage
that countenance female genital mutilation (28%) tracks pretty
closely with the percentage of those who find indigenous
cosmologies “no less true” (31%).
Horowitz, Yaworsky, and Kickham offer an explanation for
all this that makes a good deal of sense, although it by no
means upholds the principle that anthropology as presently
construed can be treated as a serious science. Moral founda-
tions theory, they write, suggests that “more is going on than
simply intellectual disagreement about the credibility of avail-
able evidence.” The epistemological disagreements are really
surface manifestations of the moral template of the group to
which the anthropologists belong. In this instance, the political
left in anthropology finds its group foundations in “care and
fairness,” which “saturate” its “political morality.” The anthro-
pologists drawn into this charmed circle “come together in
emotive communities [that] would reproduce a discourse of
moral responsibility toward subaltern groups.”
As the authors present themselves as “part of the left-liberal
camp,” and conclude their paper by affirming that they are sit-
uated not “above the fray” but with their “fellow left-liberal col-
leagues,” I amwilling to accept their confession of bad faith. Their
commitment to “the pursuit of truth” and to “science,” which is
also reiterated in the last paragraph, sits awkwardly alongside
their other commitment. Indeed, the “group” identity they claim
and their belief that its moral foundation in the pursuit of an
emotive and therapeutic ethic of care and fairness plainly
supersedes any mere intellectual attachment to science or truth.
The article thus turns back on itself in a wide circle. The
authors end up providing substantial new evidence that supports
the picture of a rift in anthropology between those who adhere to
actual scientific standards and those who reject science in favor
of something else. What they have clarified is that the “some-
thing else” isn’t exactly “antiscience.” It includes antiscience, but
it is better understood as the self-regard of a moral clerisy.
Reply
We thank the commentators for their thoughtful reflections
on our paper. It is gratifying to have our work appraised by
such distinguished scholars.
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R. Brian Ferguson takes issue with evolutionary psychology,
particularly its conception of the brain’s functional modularity,
which has affinities with moral foundations theory (MFT). He
points to various evolutionary hypotheses that had to be walked
back, including ballyhooed genetic or dispositional accounts of
such diverse phenomena as language, abusive behavior, de-
pression, and even rape. He cautions that this should make us
skeptical of sociobiology.
Fair enough. We hardly endorse evolutionary psychology
wholesale, much less genetic reductionism. We are open, more-
over, to ongoing discoveries in brain science suggesting far-
reaching developmental plasticity. As we stressed, our use of
MFT was tentative. It strikes us as a plausible explanation of
average emotive differences between the left and the right. It is
an explanation, we might add, with a feasible evolutionary
backstory (of adaptive moral emotions) and consistent with
large-scale twin studies on the substantial heritability of vir-
tually all psychological traits, including political orientation
(Hatemi et al. 2014).
Ferguson expresses confusion, however, regarding the appli-
cability of MFT: “I do not understand how this theoretical ori-
entation even applies to the data on hand? [sic] It is not about
liberals versus conservatives but self-identified moderates,
liberals, and radicals, plus gender and disciplinary specializa-
tion.” Notwithstanding that MFT has been applied, indepen-
dent of political ideology, to gender, occupation, and more
(e.g., Graham et al. 2011), here we assumed our reasoning was
plain. Probing anthropologists’ views from the far-left to the
political middle (given virtually no conservatives or libertarians
in the field), we suspect a tempering in the intensity of their left-
wing moral sensibilities (i.e., their collective instincts to protect
vulnerable groups and to mistrust “authoritative” claims per-
ceived to derogate such groups). Indeed, we interpret the pre-
dictive power of political orientation in our data in precisely
these terms. Recallmoderate anthropologists’more pronounced
tendency to reject epistemic relativism and to affirm evolu-
tionary biology and Chagnon’s legacy (with correspondingly
less congenial views of indigenous cosmologies, alleged prehis-
toric peaceableness, and promiscuity, etc.).
Oddly, Ferguson skirts this central thrust of our findings.
Perhaps due to MFT’s innatist footing, he appears intent to
dwell on what he sees as the project’s normative implications.
He cites a variety of work (including his own) that “soundly
refutes” evolutionary accounts of prehistoric war, Yanomami
reproductive success, or the merits of Cochran, Hardy, and Har-
pending’s (2006) thesis on Ashkenazi intelligence. He views
these “rigorous criticism[s]” of sociobiology as “dispassionate”
and “informed skepticism,” unduly dismissed as “politically
correct,” and he worries that our paper provides a “political
defense” for evolutionary positions challenged on expressly
“empirical” and “theoretical” grounds.
Maybe. As we concede throughout, we do not aim to adju-
dicate the controversies. If Ferguson is right, it happens that the
more left-leaning anthropologists better track the truth in their
views on these sensitive questions. Many moderate colleagues
would no doubt demur.We can only advise caution. Awareness
of ourselves as both scientific and emotive communities may
help explain why our politics tends to align with our interpre-
tations of evidence. That Ferguson sidesteps this essential con-
nection is a pity.
Douglas Fry and Geneviève Souillac highlight our desire
for anthropologists to engage in serious self-reflection about
biases. We welcome their suggestion that our survey results
could be usefully interpreted with other frameworks. They
offer a host of questions that scholars might bring to bear in
their research in a spirit of critical reflexivity.
We certainly claim no settled position on prehistoric war or
Chagnon’s (in)famous killers-have-more-kids finding. With
respect to Fry and Souillac’s critique of Chagnon, we would
expect work that piques the moral emotions of a field to invite
a range of interpretive and other challenges. A higher level of
methodological scrutiny perhaps goes with the territory. Time
may tell, in any event, whether special attention to evolved
moral intuitions bears scientific fruit.
Fry and Souillac suggest that anthropologists should better
attend to the history and philosophy of science. For what it’s
worth, although hardly professional philosophers of science, we
are drawn to a middle ground between realism and construc-
tionism. After all, our theories are constrained both by the facts
“out there” and by our cultural precepts and interests as knowl-
edge producers. We wonder whether scholars’ attraction to
these philosophical stances might coincide in some way with
their respective moral intuitions. (A question for future study
perhaps.)
We appreciate William Jankowiak’s laudatory appraisal of
our project. EchoingWrong’s (1961) classic critique of sociology,
Jankowiak laments what he sees as inadequate psychological
grounding in anthropology’s analyses of human behavior. He
finds more to lament, in fact, in the drift of postmodern rel-
ativism from the humanities and social sciences into—of all
places—the Republican Party. In such an “insecure culture,”
where truth is “up for grabs,” anthropology founders by dis-
avowing psychoanalytic or evolutionary insights into human
subjectivity.
Jankowiak finds much to recommend in our sketch of the
field’s “epistemological tribes.”His concern that anthropologists
too often talk past each other or refuse to recognize opposing
interpretations seems, sadly, to ring true. While praising our
emphasis on contrasting moral emotions, he goes further in
proposing a class dimension to anthropology’s relativist-activist
subculture. We find the hypothesis intriguing. His astute ob-
servation reminds us of the anthropologist-cum-journalist Sa-
rah Kendzior’s (2012) wry portrayal of the plight of debt-ridden
adjuncts at an AAA conference. We cannot help but quote
Kendzior: “When I expressed doubt about the jobmarket to one
colleague, she advised me, with total seriousness, to ‘re-evaluate
what work means’ and to consider ‘post-work imaginaries.’ ”
Whatever the reach of such a “patrician” sensibility, wewelcome
efforts to map anthropology’s emotive terrain beyond our focus
on moral intuitions.
We learned much by reading Peter Peregrine’s analysis of the
AAA’s inner workings. His observations provide useful context
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for our paper. Peregrine’s comments about the sudden change of
venue from San Francisco to Atlanta dovetail with the concerns
raised in the abovementioned Kendzior essay. His observations
about the refusal of the AAA to host some of the scientific panels
also corresponds with Jankowiak’s position of a field talking past
each other. We are delighted this forum provided a space for
Peregrine to share his important account of leadership dynamics
in the AAA.
Peter Wood draws attention to some of the ambiguities in
our questionnaire. Arriving at surefire language in a survey is
well-nigh impossible. That does not invalidate his criticism,
but about all we can say is that we did our best and the signif-
icant results and patterns are not easily explained away. Wood
suggests that although our thesis is “doubtful,” we “offer much
of interest,” and he evaluates us as being “moderately successful”
at disentangling the empirical and normative aspects of an-
thropology’s controversies. He notes the contribution we made
by documenting the depths of “antiscience epistemology” in the
field. And he finds that our explanation makes “a good deal of
sense.”
Weare of course pleased with these assessments.Wood in fact
captures a key thread of our argument well: “The epistemological
disagreements are really surface manifestations of the moral
template of the group to which the anthropologists belong.” Yet
in elaborating, hemakes inflated claims that appear to render our
argument contradictory. Wood suggests, for example, that our
open identification as left-liberals amounts to a “confession of
bad faith,” which he accepts. It is not altogether clear what he
means. Apparently he views political commitment as inherently
antithetical to the pursuit of scientific truth. The authors’ “com-
mitment” as left-liberals, he notes, “sits awkwardly alongside”
their “commitment to the ‘pursuit of truth’ and to ‘science.’ ”He
continues with his most provocative point, which we should
quote at length: “Indeed, the ‘group’ identity they claim and
their belief that itsmoral foundation in the pursuit of an emotive
and therapeutic ethic of care and fairness plainly supersedes any
mere intellectual attachment to science or truth.”
Here we believe Wood overplays his hand. We demonstrate,
to be sure, the impact of scholars’ moral intuitions on their
interpretations of evidence. Our attention to the “politics of
knowledge” certainly contravenes naive views of value-free
knowledge production in the academy. Yet must we bend the
stick so far as to reduce social science to a jockeying over
identity and values?
In his intuitionist model of moral reasoning, Jonathan Haidt
(2012) designates our reasoning faculty the “rider” and our un-
derlying moral intuitions, the “elephant.” Drawing on David
Hume, Haidt stresses that the elephant usually rules the day,
dwarfing the influence of the tiny rider. Yet again, we stress
usually. Haidt differs fromHume in suggesting that the rider acts
as a lawyer and that the lawyer can sometimes persuade the
client, overriding her underlying emotions. That is to say, reason
is the lawyer and sometimes the lawyer’s counsel has effect. This
is our fundamental point. If we wish to overcome the blunders
caused by our biased attachments to our seemingly intractable
moral foundations, then we had better heed the lawyer when the
lawyer is informed by science. This is by no means an easy task.
But we reiterate, and we believe without contradiction, that rec-
ognizing our emotive roadblocks might just clear a path to better
approach the truth.
—Mark Horowitz, William Yaworsky,
and Kenneth Kickham
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